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Though understood in various ways, American liber-
alism was sufficiently well-focused to have been the dominant 
viewpoint of American politics in the years following World 
War II. James Q. Wilson said that liberalism was America's 
"ruling philosophy" throughout this period. 1 Robert Booth 
Fowler examined the assertion, commonly made in the 1950s, 
that we had reached the end of ideology, and concluded that 
this belief reflected not the decline, but the pre-eminence, 
of liberalism. The vehemence which met a challenge to the 
prevailing orthodoxy, such as the 1964 Goldwater presidential 
campaign, hardly suggests a political order indifferent to 
ideology. 2 
The era of liberal hegemony is now clearly over, or 
it has at least been suspended indefinitely. Recent years 
have seen a series of electoral developments-~George 
McGovern's landslide defeat in 1972, the passage of Proposi-
tion 13 and other tax cutting measures in the late 1970s, and 
1James Q. Wilson, "Liberalism and Purpose," Commentary 
May 1972, p. 74. 
2Robert Booth Fowler, Believing Skeptics: American 
Political Intellectuals, 1945-1964 (Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood Press, 1978), pp. 291-294. 
1 
2 
the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980--suggesting that there 
is scarcely any popular enthusiasm for adding on to the 
existing structure of liberal programs, and some sentiment 
for rescinding policies that have been in place for many 
years. A number of observers agree that American liberalism 
is confused and unable to explain itself. James Nuechterlein 
says that liberalism is suffering from a crisis, the existence 
and severity of which "almost no one on the political spec-
trum, including liberals, would dispute." 3 Of American 
political attitudes in the mid-seventies, John Frederick 
Martin writes: 
Most people, liberals included, considered the government 
incapable of solving social problems and were tired of 
its trying--tired of federal coercion, and tired of civil 
rights. They went on to new battles, so swiftly changing 
their views and so utterly dismissing liberal ideas that 
the liberals of the 1960s appeared, only ten years later, 
as curious relics of a distant past.4 
By the end of the 1970s, liberals were on the defensive, 
responding to ideas generated by others rather than advancing 
new proposals based on their own principles. The Democratic 
alternative to Ronald Reagan's 1981 tax plan, for example, 
would have been slightly more beneficial to the "middle class," 
3 James A. Nuechterlein, "The People vs. The Interests," 
Commentary, March 1975, pp. 66-67. 
4John Frederick Martin, Civil Rights and the Crisis of 
Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976 (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1979), p. 243. 
3 
which the Democratic bill took to mean anyone earning 
$50,000 a year or less--the ninety-fifth percentile in the 
American income distribution. And the Democratic proposals 
on depreciation and corporate taxes were considered the 
better deal by many businessmen. 5 Many liberals seemed 
unsure whether their traditional agenda was even defensible. 
As the New Republic editorialized, "The voters' impression 
that the liberal regime of government is partly responsible 
for our present dilemma, and that liberals have little to 
say about how we should get out of it, is justified."6 
The severity of liberalism's present distress makes 
it somewhat easier and a good deal more important to achieve 
a clear understanding of modern American liberalism. The 
role of liberalism in American politics in the immediate 
future is unclear: the possibilities include the continuing 
decline and sterility of liberalism, the return of tradi-
tional liberalism to a leading position in American politics, 
or some sort of reformulation of the liberal approach to 
government. To be prepared to understand these developments 
requires some sense of how American liberals understood the 
country's situation and their own during the years of their 
preeminence and subsequent decline. It may be also that 
5Daniel Seligman, "The Search For a Liberal Agenda," 
Fortune, 24 August 1981, p. 63. 
6
"In Defer.se of Good Intentions,: New Republic, 
13 December 1980, p. 5. 
4 
liberalism is somewhat easier to understand now that its 
premises are being reevaluated, and many thoughtful people 
feel an historical and intellectual remoteness from the 
liberalism of the fifties and sixties. This longer perspec-
tive should make the contours of liberalism easier to dis-
cern. 
There is a small body of literature devoted to the 
analysis of modern American liberalism, including some works 
that make important contributions to understanding particular 
aspects of liberalism. None of these studies attempt the 
project here contemplated, however--the study of liberalism 
as a system of ideas about American public policy. 
The best study of modern American liberalism is 
Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism by John Frederick 
Martin. Martin studies how the civil rights issue changed 
the politics of the Democratic Party from 1945 to 1976. He 
argues that while Franklin Roosevelt had placated Southern 
whites so all factions of the Democratic Party would support 
the New Deal, Harry Truman set the party on an irreversible 
course towards the full acceptance of all the claims of the 
civil rights movement. By the mid-sixties the Democrats had 
recognized that their coalition could no longer include 
Southern racists and blacks, and chose to reject the former--
the only electoral votes Barry Goldwater won from outside 
Arizona came from the Deep South. At just the point when 
5 
liberal Democrats wanted to consider the problem of race 
solved and turn to the problem of poverty, the two came 
together in an explosive mixture. The efforts to help the 
blacks of the northern ghetto, whose problems made Jim Crow 
seem no less evil but much simpler, shattered the fragile 
consensus that had backed the liberal vision of racial and 
economic justice. Though their intentions were only decent, 
and their assessment of the nation's needs was plausible, 
liberals were run over by history, says Martin, and have yet 
to recover. 
Where Martin concentrates on liberal politics, 
Theodore J. Lowi's study, The End of Liberalism, is about the 
governmental practice of liberalism. 7 He finds its approach 
to be disordered and destructive: "Liberalism replaces plan-
ning with bargaining."8 Most of the legislation passed by 
Congress does not actually decide anything; instead, the 
legislature confers broad discretionary power on federal 
agencies and departments, who must then issue rules that 
accomodate the demands of an array of interest-groups. 
Lowi scores the sunny belief that pluralism can save us from 
political pain--the inclusion of all interested parties does 
not necessarily solve our problems, and the excessive faith 
in pluralism as a governing procedure may keep us from ever 
7Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second 
Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 
1979). 
8 Ibid., p. 68. 
6 
confronting our real political needs. 
A third book covers another aspect of modern American 
liberalism. Beyond the New Deal, by Alonzo Hamby, examines 
the relationship between liberals and President Harry 
9 Truman. The years from 1945 through 1953 were crucial to 
American liberalism. Liberals had to define themselves with-
out reference to Franklin Roosevelt, and there was a fight 
for the soul of the liberal movement between opponents and 
supporters of Truman's Cold War policies. Hamby's account 
of the emergence of "vital center liberalism" is detailed 
and comprehensive, though not deeply analytical. 
James A. Nuechterlein has written several insightful 
essays on modern American liberalism. The most detailed is 
"Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar 
Liberalism," a study of Schlesinger's political writings as 
representative of the thought of modern American liberalism. 10 
This article is the scholarly work closest to this disserta-
tion, though the subject matter is broader, focusing on 
liberalism's position on civil rights, macroeconomics, and 
foreign policy issues, as well as the welfare state, and 
narrower in the method, using just one source as an indicator 
9 Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S 
Truman and American Liberali-s~m~(~N~e~w~~Y~o-r~k~:~-C~o~l~um~b-1~-a~U~n~i~v~e~r-
sity Press, 1973). 
10James A. Nuechterlein, "Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr., and the Discontents of Postwar Liberalism," Review of 
Polites 39 (January 1977): 3-40. 
7 
of liberal thinking. According to Nuechterlein, Schlesinger 
began with a reasonably clear answer to liberalism's problem 
in the late 1940s: how to claim and defend the middle ground 
between Henry Wallace and the National Association of Manu-
facturers. But liberalism, as reflected in Schlesinger's 
writings, slowly unraveled when confronted with a prosperous 
consumer society, Vietnam, civil rights, urban riots, and 
white backlash. Nuechterlein's conclusion, that liberals 
wanted the best of several worlds, and were incapable of 
making necessary choices, is elaborated in his essays, "The 
People vs. The Interests," and "The Liberal World Confronts 
the Reagan Era." 11 
Other intellectual histories constitute a helpful 
introduction to the dissertation. Some of these works are 
very general: these include The Politics of Affluence: 
Ideology in the United States since World War II, by James 
P. Young, and Believing Skeptics: American Political Intel-
lectuals, 1945-1964, by Robert Booth Fowler. Both books are 
concerned with wider topics than American liberalism. The 
Evolution of Liberalism, by Harry K. Girvetz, attempts to 
establish the relationship between eighteenth and twentieth 
century liberalism, but is more scholarly and dispassionate 
11 ' James A. Nuechterlein, "The People vs The Interests" 
Commentary, March 1975, pp. 66 73; James A. Nuechterlein, 
"The Liberal World Confronts the Reagan Era," American 
Spectator, February 1982, pp. 20-23. 
8 
in treating the former. The Decline of American Liberalism, 
by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., and Rendezvous with Destiny, by 
Eric Goldman, trace American liberalism from the nineteenth 
century through the New Deal, providing valuable historical 
grounding, but leaving off where the dissertation will 
. 12 beg1n. 
Those works concerned with liberalism in more recent 
years concentrate on the practice rather than the theory. 
Two important analyses of the Great Society are The Great 
Society: Lessons for the Future, edited by Robert M. Solow 
and Eli Ginzberg, and The Promise of Greatness, by Sar A. 
Levitan and Robert Taggert. These books carefully examine 
the formulation, funding, and implementation of the major 
social welfare programs of the sixties. Between the lines 
one can glean some insights into the ideology that justified 
these programs. Two other books speak at greater length, 
but less cautiously, about liberalism and the Great Society. 
They are On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives From Experience, 
edited by James L. Sundquist, and The Great Society Reader: 
The Failure of American Liberalism, edited by Marvin E. 
Gettleman and David Mermelstein. Finally, The Cost of Good 
12James P. Young, The Politics of Affluence: Ideology 
in the United States Since World War II (San Fransicso: 
Chandler, 1968); Fowler, Believing Skeptics; Harry K. Girvetz, 
The Evolution of Liberalism (London: Collier, 1963); Arthur A. 
Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism (New York: 
Atheneum, 1967); Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952). 
9 
Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-
1975, by Charles R. Morris, derives some important lessons 
: 13 
about liberalism from its implementation in one major c1ty. 
The other sort of writing about liberalism dispenses 
with the study of its history, in thought or action. Pro-
ceeding on the assumption that the content of the liberal 
program is sufficiently clear, these essays go on to examine 
some of its hidden implications. Joseph Cropsey's essay, 
"Liberalism and Conservatism," is the most notable of these. 
Cropsey argues that liberalism takes classical and Christian 
notions of virtue and charity, and tries to make them modern 
by applying them in an egalitarian and positivistic way, 
resulting in a political viewpoint that is theoretically 
confused but politically popular. Other good works in this 
vein would include: Peter Clecak, Crooked Paths: Reflections 
on Socialism, Conservatism, and the Welfare State; Arnold S. 
Kaufman, The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics; 
Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left; David 
Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel;" Michael Walzer, "In 
13Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, ed., The Great 
Society: Lessons for the Future (New York: Basic Books, 
1974); SarA. Levitan and Robert Taggert, The Promise of 
Greatness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); James 
L. Sundquist, ed., On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives From 
Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Marvin E. Gettle-
man and David Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader: 
The Failure of American Liberalism (New York: Random House, 
1967); Charles R. Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions: New 
York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-1975 (New York: 
Norton, 1980). 
10 
Defense of Equality;" Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the 
14 People;" and James Q. Wilson, "Liberalism and Purpose." 
Helpful though this body of literature may be t~ the 
understanding of modern American liberalism, it leaves a gap 
which this dissertation will occupy, though not fill. Between 
critical works that do not examine the actual words and deeds 
of liberalism, and historical works that do not go beyond 
chronicling the evolution of liberalism, there is a need for 
a critical intellectual history of modern American liberalism, 
in which evaluation is tied directly to evidence of liberals' 
goals and perceptions. 
To provide such an intellectual history requires 
carefully delimiting what will be studied and how. Liberalism 
addresses itself to all kinds of questions of public policy 
as well as, more broadly, social and cultural issues. A 
study of liberalism with respect to all these matters would 
be, if it were possible at all, a very long book indeed. In 
the interests of brevity and cohesion, this dissertation will 
14Joseph Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism," in 
Left, Right, and Center, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 42-59; Peter Clecak, Crooked Paths: 
Reflections on Socialism, Conservatism, and the Welfare State 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977); ArnoldS. Kaufman, The 
Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1968); Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the 
American Left (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); David 
Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," Public Interest 39 
(Spring 1975): 3-30; Michael Walzer, "In Defense of Equality," 
The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left, ed. Lewis 
A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York: Quadrangle, 1974), pp. 
107-123; Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the People," Com-
mentary, August 1973, pp 25-32; Wilson, "Liberalism and 
Purpose." 
ll 
concentrate on the welfare state. It seems fair to regard 
liberalism as being most clearly distinguished by its attitude 
towards the welfare state. The liberal of 1945 probably would 
differ from the liberal of 1983 on U.S. foreign policy, or 
the management of the economy, or race relations. But it is 
a safe guess that both would feel that government, especially 
the federal government, should do more to help people secure 
adequate incomes, housing, health care and education. It is 
in the advocacy of the welfare state also that liberals have 
most clearly and consistently differed with their conserva-
tive opposition. To study liberalism with respect to the 
welfare state, then, is to study it with respect to the one 
issue that can best reveal the character of modern liberalism. 
The selection of the best sources to use for a study 
of liberalism is even more important and difficult than the 
selection of a topic around which to organize such a study. 
American liberalism is far from being a tightly organized 
body of opinion, and there is nothing resembling an official 
liberal spokesman. In view of the width and variety of 
American liberalism, a comprehensive history of it is probably 
impossible: to include every source that any student of the 
subject might regard as reflecting liberalism would be to 
include many sources that many knowledgeable authorities 
regard as unrelated to liberalism. This dissertation will 
rely on some of the sources most widely and plausibly 
12 
regarded as having articulated mainstream liberal ideas. The 
political writings of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. are one source 
we will rely on as indicative of liberal thought. Schlesinger 
has been called a "weather vane of which way the wind is 
blowing in liberal circles," and "perhaps the most represen-
tative figure of mid-twentieth century liberalism •••. " 15 
His "enormous journalistic output, both learned and popular" 
covers the period from 1945, and reflects how liberalism 
d ff d t Am . 16 reacte to and a ecte pos war er1ca. A second and third 
source will be the magazines, Nation and New Republic. Robert 
Lekachman relied on these two sources when writing an informal 
history of postwar liberalism, as did Hamby in his book on 
Truman and liberals. 17 Though the Americans for Democratic 
Action has been more concerned with realizing than clarifying 
the liberal agenda, its published and archival material 
provides some additional insights into liberal thinking since 
1945. Though never powerful in its own right, the ADA 
reflected "vital center" liberalism better than any other 
. t. 18 organ1za 1on. 
15John Rosenberg, "If FDR Were Alive Today ••• " Nation, 
15 April 1978, p. 420; Henry Fairlie, review of Robert Kennedy 
and His Times, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New Republic, 
9 September 1978, p. 30. 
16 John Taft, :'The Once and Future Mandarin," New 
Republic, 26 November 1977, p. 18. 
17Robert Lekachman, "Fashions in Liberalism," Nation, 
20 September 1965, pp. 62-66; Hamby, p. 603. 
18 Hamby, p. 508. 
13 
An interpretation of the writings of just one man 
will always be open to doubts: has too much emphasis been 
given to one unrepresentative article, or a false connection 
been drawn between two very different works? These problems 
are much greater when the body of writing to be examined 
includes thirty-five years' publication of two weekly 
journals, involving several editors, dozens of editorialists, 
and hundreds of authors of reviews and articles. Yet the 
greater magnitude of the problem does not change its 
nature; the interpreter must still attempt to read his 
material carefully, thoroughly, and with an open mind, 
drawing the most plausible conclusions he can, knowing that 
equally judicious readers may arrive at different interpre-
tations. This dissertation must, and will endeavor to, be 
particularly careful about assuming a single purpose or view-
point is shared by the many thinkers to be examined, the sort 
of assumption that is usually safe in the study of a single 
author. On the other hand, our familiarity with the subject 
matter of this dissertation makes it easier to assess its 
conclusions than those of intellectual histories treating 
more remote or obscure subjects. Our common sense knowledge 
of modern liberalism is not a perfect standard for assessing 
scholarly interpretations of the subject--if it were, scholarly 
interpretations would be unnecessary--but it does provide a 
useful way to guard against strained or slanted readings of 
liberals' opinions. 
14 
The selection of 1945 as a starting point for this 
study is more than the use of an obvious benchmark. The 
death of Franklin Roosevelt removed a galvanizing figure who, 
through political skill and personal magnetism, had allowed 
American liberalism to survive its internal disorder. 
According to Nation's eulogy of FDR: 
Throughout the last twelve years the progressive political 
movement in this country hLs slowly crystallized around 
Mr. Roosevelt. It has not developed--or had a chance to 
develop--an independent program or national leadership •••. 
In the President and the New Deal lay the strength of the 
whole progressive movement--and its we~kness. In the 
degree to which American progressivism has been depen-
dent on the President, it must experience a readjustment 
of values, a process of reintegration, before it can 
face adequately the new demands which will be made upon 
•t 19 1 • 
Though the full meaning of liberalism will become 
clearer in the body of the dissertation, it would be useful 
to anchor the discussion to a provisional definition. Two 
compatible but not identical definitions can provide a good 
beginning. According to Arnold Kaufman: 
Liberals believe that a good society is one in which 
each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, 
and spirit, as well as the opportunities to carve out a 
career in conformity to that person's own nature and 
reasoned choice.20 
Robert Lekachman's definition is less precise but more in-
dicative of the soul of liberalism: 
19 Freda Kirchwey, "End of an Era," Nation, 21 April 
1945, p. 430. 
20 Kaufman, p. 6. 
15 
Liberalism is even more an attitude than it is a program. 
Liberals are critical of injustice, suspicious of vested 
interests, friendly to change, hopeful of peaceful improve-
ment and convinced that reasoned argument ultimately 
overcomes selfish opposition.21 · 
That the attitude described by Lekachman should operate on 
the goals outlined by Kaufman by favoring a welfare state, 
in which the government undertakes such tasks as redis-
tributing income, guaranteeing economic security, and assur-
ing decent housing, health care, and education for all 
22 
citizens, would seem wholly reasonable. A more detailed 
description of liberals' premises that lead them to the 
welfare state, the goals they seek in it, the methods they 
are willing and unwilling to employ, and how their views of 
the welfare state distinguish them from others on the Ameri-
can political spectrum will be the concern of the ensuing 
chapters. 
21 Lekachman, p. 62. 
22 Clark, p. 69. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LIBERALISM'S PREMISES 
Liberalism is, generically, the creed of all those 
who insist that a good society give ample scope to human 
liberty. Modern American liberals, in the narrower sense in 
which we shall be using the term, are members of this larger 
club, advocates of freedom under law. But devotion to 
liberty is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition 
for being a liberal in America; Arthur Schlesinger acknowl-
edges that conservatives are, in the broad sense, liberal 
about the basic shape of American society, too. To ascertain 
the distinctive features of liberalism we will begin by 
attempting to understand the premises of liberalism, to see 
the fundamental facts of American political life as they have 
been seen by prominent liberals. 1 
I 
If adherence to liberty is not enough to distinguish 
liberals from conservatives, there is the desire among 
liberals to dissociate themselves from the least attractive 
1Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Liberalism," Saturday 
Review, 8 June 1957, pp. 11-12. 
16 
17 
aspects usually ascribed to conservatism--an excessive fear 
of change that is the companion of a slavish and unreasoning 
reliance on old ways and ideas. Their writings would suggest 
that liberals are more comfortable with a picture of them-
selves as the party of the future than the party of the past. 
Liberals would rather challenge Americans than comfort them. 
According to Schlesinger: 
[Liberalism] must oppose the drift into the homogenized 
society. It must fight spiritual unemployment as it 
once fought economic unemployment. It must concern it-
self with the quality of popular culture and the charac-
ter of lives to be lived in our abundant society. 2 
Even as America needs, for her own well-being, to be chal-
lenged, America cannot fulfill her mission among the nations 
of the world by boasting smugly of past accomplishments. We 
must come to grips with the "revolutionary thrust of our 
time [and] the human longings which animate it" by reviving 
3 
our original mission as a bearer of hope to the oppressed. 
This liberal belief in the importance of noble 
aspirations and invigorating challenges found its clearest 
expression in the way liberals reacted to John Kennedy's 
presidency. Though later reassessments may have judged 
Kennedy's foreign policy as too aggressive and his domestic 
policies as too timid, liberals reacted favorably at the time 
2 Ibid., p. 37. 
3Adlai E. Stevenson, "The Mission of Liberalism," 
New Republic, 24 September 1956, p. 11. 
18 
to the way Kennedy addressed a nation that had grown self-
satisfied during the fifties. Arthur Schlesinger, who 
switched to John Kennedy in 1960 rather than support Adla·i 
Stevenson for president a third time, said that Kennedy car-
ried forward and completed a change in liberal politics 
begun by Stevenson. When Stevenson was nominated in 1952, 
a liberal politician was more likely to tell voters about 
benefits than to demand exertions. 
Stevenson changed all that. His lofty conception of 
politics, his conviction that affluence was not enough 
for the good life, his impatience with liberal cliches, 
his contempt for conservative complacency, his summons 
to the young, his demand for new ideas, his respect for 
the people who had them, his belief that history afforded 
no easy answers, his call for strong public leadership--
all this ~et the tone for a new era in Democratic 
politics. 
By 1960 Kennedy was talking in the "Stevenson idiom" by 
5 
stressing "peril, uncertainty, sacrifice, purpose." The 
New Republic expressed the hope that Kennedy's distinctive 
contribution would survive him: "We are counting on a rising 
market for quality; on the persistence of that creative 
dedication, disciplined by social responsibility, that is 
represented by the Peace Corps and the civil rights move-
ment."6 
4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John 
F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 
p. 23. 
6
"The New Republic After Half A Century," New 
Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 16. 
19 
Arthur Schlesinger in particular was beguiled by the 
idea that good politics should be a source of excitement. 
Anticipating the end of a long conservative decade, he wrote: 
The '60s will probably be spirited, articulate, inven-
tive, incoherent, turbulent, with energy shooting off 
wildy in all directions. Above all there will be a 
sense of motion, of leadership, of hope. 
When this happens, America will be herself again. 
she will deal affirmatively and imaginatively with her 
problems •••• 7 
Schlesinger seemed proudest of the way in which the Kennedy 
administration appealed to the young people of America, 
stirring their best instincts and making governmental service 
and political activity respectable again. 8 
All of this uplifting and inspiring tells us very 
little about what it is that liberals are challenging us to 
do. But it would be wrong to regard liberal enthusiasm as 
nothing more than an ingredient for achieving liberal goals. 
Liberals believe they represent the better angels of the 
American national character--though America occasionally 
forsakes liberalism, she always returns and becomes herself 
again. Liberals like to think they are on the side of both 
history and the people. This was the source of their 
optimism in the forties and fifties, fed by cheering election 
7 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Hope 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 93. 
8
schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 740. 
20 
results. The 1948 election, the first test of New Deal 
liberalism without FDR, was particularly important. "Re-
action is repudiated," said the New Republic after Truinan's 
victory. "The New Deal is again empowered to carry forward 
the promise of American life." 9 Truman's election, said the 
ADA, showed a liberal-labor coalition so strong "it could 
remake America." 10 There was a similar sense of the re-
affirmation of the relation between liberalism and America 
after Barry Goldwater's defeat in 1964. In some ways, though, 
the 1952 election may have been the most encouraging--not 
because liberals won, but because the first Republican presi-
dent since Hoover found it necessary to accept the New Deal 
as a fact of American political life beyond rescinding. 11 
Some liberals have expressed the hope that the 
altruism embodied in liberalism will be reflected in ideas 
and sentiments widely held, rather than just in Americans' 
behavior in the voting booth. Irving Sarnoff, for example, 
writing in New Republic, voices the belief that more generous 
welfare programs "might provide the youth of this country 
9
"Damn the Torpedos!" New Republic, 15 November 1948, 
pg. 1. 
10
"Truman Triumph Heralds New Era; Liberal-Labor 
Forces in Key Role," ADA World, 10 November 1948, p. 1. 
11
schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 68. See 
also Young, The Politics of Affluence, p. 212. 
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with living institutions which would represent a buffer 
against the prevailing values of the marketplace. If 
children could grow up believing that it is considered 
socially legitimate for them seriously to work toward group 
ends rather than individual ones (while not, thereby, losing 
'individuality'), much of the competitiveness which now 
12 
seems to promote cases of delinquency might be reduced." 
Even Arthur Schlesinger, who, as we shall see, likes to 
regard himself as among the least sentimental of liberals, 
asserted, without any supporting evidence, that America's 
turn from conservatism to liberalism in the early sixties 
corresponded to a decline of narrow self-interest as a 
political force. "Farmers dislike the excesses of the farm 
program. Workers begin to wonder whether higher wages are 
the answer to every thing. Businessmen know that everything 
else in society cannot be sacrificed to their own profits."13 
There are dangers in this close identification of 
personal good will and liberal politics. It tends towards 
the conclusion that liberal programs must have improbable 
levels of public support to succeed. A New Republic article 
favoring a national housing program said that "every town, 
12Irving Sarnoff, "Bad Boys, Bad Times," New Republic, 
18 January 1960, p. 14. 
13
schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 91. 
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metropolitan area and rural region in this country should 
have an energetic citizens' housing and planning organization, 
representing a cross-section of popular interests and profes-
sional knowledge, intimately acquainted with the operations 
1 1 . "14 of oca agenc1es, ••• This close identification between 
liberalism and personal decency can also lead to an exces-
sively politicized understanding of the way Americans behave. 
When Congress weakened World War II price controls in 1946, 
Nation said that the battle against excessive prices and 
profits could still be won "if consumers retain the price 
consciousness they have shown ••.• and refuse, individually 
and collectively, to submit to profiteering." 15 This is not 
the most plausible explanation of people's reluctance to 
buy high-priced goods. A suffocating embrace by liberals 
of admirable, but not extraordinary, personal conduct, 
raises the danger that liberalism, like socialism, would 
take up too many evenings. 
Arthur Schlesinger is the most prominent liberal 
critic of the excessive optimism and sentimentality of 
of certain liberals. Schlesinger tried hard to popularize 
a corrective sobriety, based on the political philosophy of 
Reinhold Niebuhr. He approvingly quotes Niebuhr's 
14
catherine Bauer, "The Middle Class Needs Houses 
Too, New Republic, 29 August 1949, p. 19. 
15 
"The Shape of Things," Nation, 3 August 1946, 
p. 114. 
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characterization of the "prevailing liberal climate" in 
1936: "Appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood 
are bound to be efficacious in the end. If they have not 
been so to date we must have more appeals to love, justice, 
good-will and brotherhood."16 From the perspective of 1956, 
Schlesinger viewed such wooly-mindedness as a problem sur-
mounted but a continuing temptation for liberalism. He was 
sterner in The Vital Center in 1949, when liberalism's future 
was in greater doubt: 
We must grow up now and forsake the millenial dream. We 
will not arise one morning to find all need for further 
strain and struggle ended, while we work two hours a 
day and spend our leisure eating milk and honey. Given 
human imperfection, society will continue imperfect. 
Problems will always torment us, because all important 
problems are insoluble; that is why they are important. 
The good comes from the continuing struggle to try and 
solve them, not from the vain hope of their solution.l7 
Following Niebuhr, Schlesinger makes respect for 
human fallibility the basis of liberalism. Schlesinger says 
that liberals must confront the pressing problems of an 
industrialized society without losing sight of liberalism's 
much older commitment to the limited state, due process, 
gradualism, and empiricism. To think only of the good things 
that might be accomplished if enough power were given to 
16
schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 102. 
17Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
The Politics of Freedom (Boston: 
p. 254. 
Jr., The Vital Center: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 
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good people is to ignore the corrupting effects of power and 
the impossibility of guaranteeing the rectitude of those 
. ld 't 18 who w1e 1 . 
Despite Schlesinger's efforts, caution, pessimism, 
a keen sense of human fallibility--these attitudes still 
seem more appropriate to the conservative than the liberal 
outlook. Eleanor Roosevelt, not Reinhold Niebuhr, seems to 
embody the spirit of liberalism. Even Schlesinger himself, 
as we have seen, was susceptible to the bAlief that a certain 
style of national leadership could elicit dramatic changes 
in popular attitudes, human fallibility not withstanding. 
Of course, liberals have not expressed much optimism during 
their decline over the last fifteen years. But whether this 
is only a temporary reaction to unfortunate circumstances, 
whether liberalism will again be filled with hope and 
enthusiasm when it sees its face reflected in America, must 
await the reascendence of liberalism. 19 
II 
In addition to trying to inculcate a certain pessimism 
in liberalism, Schlesinger has tried hard, and more success-
fully, to displace any excessively refined theorizing with 
18Ib1'd., p. 156. S 1 166 ee a so p. • 
19Nuechterlein, "Schlesinger," pp. 9-11. See also 
Young, The Politics of Affluence, p. 32. 
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with an uncomplicated pragmatism. 
I say that the liberal is the pragmatist. The liberal's 
greatest danger is not to understand this about himself 
and to conceive himself instead as the rationalist •••. 
The tradition of American liberalism has been skeptical 
and empirical. It has thus made successfully the transi-
tion from the classical liberalism of laissez-faire 
economics to the social liberalism of the welfare state--
from Adam Smith to Keynes, from Jefferson to Franklin 
Roosevelt. 20 
Liberals like Schlesinger have turned the absence of a 
detailed theoretical approach to politics into one of the New 
Deal's greatest virtues. Because of its pragmatism the New 
Deal was able to urgently attack the problems of the Depres-
sion, without waiting to resolve trivial abstractions. 
While theoretical constraints had paralyzed both capitalists 
and socialists in the 1930s, New Dealers simply pressed ahead 
with their experiments, trusting that American democracy was 
sensible enough to steer away from difficulties without the 
aid of refined public philosophies. 21 
It is not surprising that John Dewey, the foremost 
defender of pragmatism, has been praised in the pages of 
Nation and New Republic. "Dewey, as much as any living man 
or woman, has laid the foundations for a dwelling place for 
liberalism and rationalism."22 Dewey's insistence that growth 
20
schlesinger, "Liberalism," p. 12. 
21Barr King, "Leon Keyserling's New Look," Nation, 
14 January 1950, p. 33; Schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, 
p. 70. 
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"The Shape of Things," Nation, 22 October 1949, 
p. 385. 
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was the ultimate goal of good ethics and good politics 
appealed to liberals who felt "the need to supplement the 
narrow, self-centered individualism of the past with a new 
social conception of individuality consonant with the in-
dustrial conditions under which we live." 23 
It has been through pragmatism, some liberals have 
argued, that American liberalism has been able to adhere to 
the principles of Jefferson during the rapid industrializa-
tion that transformed Jefferson's America. Laissez-faire 
probably is the way to promote life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness in an agrarian society, but an industrial, 
urban society requires new methods to realize these goals. 
If it is to retain the flexibility to pursue its goals, 
liberalism can never be too closely identified with a par-
ticular agenda or ideology. The liberal's overriding commit-
ment to freedom and welfare will lead him to do battle 
against various sorts of entrenched power in various circum-
stances, whether aristocrats, capitalists, dictators, or 
bureaucrats. 24 
Schlesinger has extolled pragmatism as a distinc-
tively American outlook essential to the nation's historical 
23Y. H. Krikorian, "The Ethics of Naturalism," New 
Republic, 17 October 1949, p. 34. See also Max J. Skidmore, 
American Political Thought (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), 
pp. 214-215. 
24
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27 
attainments. According to Schlesinger: 
Through American history ideas have served as a 
means of releasing economic initiative and then as -a 
means of chastening economic arrogance; as a means of 
stimulating private energy and then as a means of assert-
ing public responsibility ••.. What has mattered has been 
the philosophical flexibility, the intellectual resili-
ence of the people--the capacity to face new problems 
relatively unencumbered by the cults and cliches of the 
past •••• The ability to change one's mind turns out, on 
last analysis, to be the secret of American economic 
growth, without which resources, population, climate, 
and.th~5other favoring factors would have been of no ava1l. 
America's ability to see its situation clearly, unscreened 
by an ideology, has permitted this country to accomplish 
great things, even under the duress of war and internal 
conflict. 26 
Schlesinger has gone so far as to say that prag-
matism is the central issue in the political struggles of our 
times. The"world civil war," he wrote, is "between dogmatism 
and pragmatism; between the theological society and the 
experimental society, between ideology and democracy." 27 
In this view the Cold War became a struggle between rigidity 
and flexibility, and liberals had to defend the pragmatic 
vital center from extremist ideologues to the left and right. 
"25 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Ideas and Economic 
Development," in Paths of American Thought, ed. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., and Morton White (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
196 3 ) ' p • 119 • 
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Freedom implies humility, not absolutism; it implies not 
the tyranny of the one but the tolerance of the many. 
Against the monotholic world the American intellectual 
tradition affirms the pluralistic world. Against ~he 
world of coercion, it affirms the world of choice. 8 
The rejection of tolerance, pluralism, and choice 
leads to dogmatism, and dogmatism, according to this argument, 
ultimately leads to totalitarianism. Totalitarianism appeals 
to many because it offers confidence and clarity to those who 
find the modern world frightening and confusing. The prag-
matic liberal is both humble, in his refusal to pretend to 
have answers to the ultiamte political questions, and brave, 
willing to keep trying to ameliDrate the political situation 
in the absence of neat, definitive political precepts. 
Pragmatism is the liberal's response to the limitations 
imposed by modern epistemology. Through pragmatism the 
liberal seeks to turn a deficiency, the inability to discern 
first principles, into the virtue of measured restraint. 
"The ADA embodies the spirit of tolerance and humility which 
is deeply rooted in the American liberal tradition. We have 
rejected the false assumption that men must ultimately set-
tle their differences over the barricades."29 
Given the gravity of America's crisis in 1933, the 
28 Ibid., p. 538. 
29Address of Wilson W. Wyatt, ADA National Chairman, 
to ADA First National Convention. ADA Press Release, 21 
February 1948. ADA papers, Series 4, number 9. See also 
Schlesinger, The Vital Center, p. 50. 
29 
New Deal could hardly await the clarification of theoretical 
subtleties; pragmatism was as good a justification for liberal 
policies as any. But the subsequent efforts, such as 
Schlesinger's, to make a virtue of this necessity are suspect. 
In the first place, even John Dewey seems to have had mis-
givings about the limitless flexibility admired by Schlesinger. 
"Experimental method is not just messing around, nor doing 
a little of this and a little of that in the hope that things 
will improve," he wrote. "Just as in the physical sciences, 
it implies a coherent body or ideas, a theory that gives 
direction to the effort." 30 Arthur Bester, in the New 
Republic, argued that Dewey believed that the implications 
of modern totalitarianism for liberals were just the opposite 
of what Schlesinger supposed. According to Bester, Dewey's 
pragmatism was helpful for liberalism until about 1930. 
When there was a widespread consensus as to what ought to be 
done, pragmatism solved the problem of how to do it--experi-
mentally. But the rise of Fascism and Communism confronted 
liberal democracy with brutal enemies; the assumption that 
all reasonable men shared the same moral outlook would no 
longer suffice. Dewey became less of a pragmatist but more 
of a liberal under these circumstances, Bester argues, 
praising democracy in terms of inalienable rights rather 
30Quoted in Rosenberg, "If FDR Were Alive Today ••• " 
p. 420. 
30 
than its latitude for social experiment. 31 
Dewey's pragmatism has been well described as "less 
a philosophy than a method of doing without one." 32 That 
Schlesinger, among others, wants liberalism to be even more 
theoretically ungoverned that Dewey was willing to tolerate 
is hardly reassuring. Such a posture renders liberalism 
confusing and pointless. Writing in Nation, Michael D. 
Reagan said of the liberal approach to politics: 
Each problem is taken by itself, without relating it 
to other problems and without any atte~pt to assess the 
extent to which some basic characteristic of our society 
may lie behind a whole range of problems. The solution 
is invariably a new federal grant-in-aid program--piece-
meal tinkering with both the federal structure and the 
economy •••• Lacking any theory of what causes social dis-
locations in America, the liberals are unable to suggest 
basic reforms that might diminish the rate at which new 
problems similar to the old ones arise.33 
Without a unifying vision, liberal pragmatism becomes nothing 
more than ad hoc experimentation. 34 
That pragmatism causes liberal intellectuals to confuse 
and mislead one another is not a mjor worry. But to the extent 
that intellectuals can make certain kinds of policies attrac-
tive or at least palatable by making them defensible, prag-
matism has undermined the possibility of achieving stable and 
31 Arthur Bestor, "John Dewey and American Liberalism," 
New Republic, 29 August 1955, pp. 18-19. 
32Quoted in Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, p. 159. 
33Michael D. Reagan, "Power and Frustration," Nation, 
5 March 1960, pp. 211, 213. 
34
see Rosenberg, "If FDR Were Alive Today ••• " p. 420. 
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durable liberal policy-making. Schlesinger inadvertently 
revealed this weakness in a biting attack on Jimmy Carter in 
1979. He compared Carter's caution unfavorably to FDR; who 
called for "bold, persistent experimentation," whose motto was 
"Above all, try something." Schlesinger says that liberals 
must approach the key problems of the eighties--energy and 
inflation--with the same boldness. He advocates selective 
wage and price controls and gasoline rationing, not as perma-
nent solutions, but "as necessary ways to buy time for that 
process of social invention, innovation and experimentation 
that is the indespensible preliminary to lasting solutions." 35 
The success of price controls and gas rationing is 
to be doubted, but this is the least of the problems with 
Schlesinger's analysis. What is particularly distressing is 
that he seems absolutely opaque to the possibility that 
flexible, even erratic, government policies have contributed 
to the problems of inflation and energy. There is no place 
in Schlesinger's analysis for the idea that imprudent mone-
tary and fiscal policies might cause or exacerbate inflation, 
or for the thought that policy experimentation may have dis-
couraged energy production and sheltered consumers from the 
realistic pricing system that can encourage energy conserva-
tion. "Above all, try something," is good advice in a 
35Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Who Needs Grover 
Cleveland?" New Republic, 7 July 1979, p. 15. 
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shipwreck; this does not make it a sound principle of naviga-
tion, and it is hard to imagine a worse attitude for avoid-
ing or riding out storms. 
There is the danger that under liberal pragmatism 
the government would occasionally solve a problem through 
blind luck, but will usually succeed only in transforming, 
perpetuating, and complicating problems. Arthur Schlesinger's 
political thinking on this point is less persuasive than that 
of James Madison, who summarized the evils of excessively 
mutable policies in Federalist #62. According to Madison, 
democracy is undermined if its laws cannot be understood, 
anticipated, or followed. Public instability favors the 
sharp insider over theindustrious citizen who lacks the time 
or opportunity to react to numerous and complex new policies. 
Frequent policy changes add to the risks facing every enter-
prise--incessant revisions of the rules discourage people from 
playing at all. It might be said that the more bold, persis-
tent experimentation there is in the public sector, the less 
there will be in the private sector. Worst of all, a govern-
ment characterized by numerous and rapid changes in public 
36 policy will forfeit the public's trust and respect. 
Stability is important for good government, but not 
equivalent to it. It will sometimes be necessary to improvise 
36
The Federalist Papers (New York: New American 
Library, 1961), pp. 381-382. 
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to secure vital goals. But a philosophy of government that 
casually tolerates--even celebrates--instability is seriously 
deficient. There ought to be a place in liberal thought for 
an appreciation of government stability akin to Madison's. 
That such a thought does not show up in the writings of the 
most prominent modern liberals results from one of two things. 
Either liberal intellectuals are remiss, and have failed to 
acknowledge that stability is not only compatible with but 
essential to liberalism's larger purposes, or liberalism is 
itself deficient, inherently antagonistic to the idea that 
wise policy makers must resist the temptation to make every 
change that seems momentarily desirable. 
III 
Liberals are democrats, and the roots of modern 
liberalism show a determination to trust and empower the 
people. The populists and the progressives of the early 
twentieth century both wanted the people to have more power 
vis-a-vis the trusts and tycoons. It was more difficult to 
be a liberal and a democrat during the 1920s; in prosperity 
the people were more tolerant of the giant economic interests 
and less interested in reform. The Depression made it pos-
sible for liberals to re-embrace the people. The underlying 
purpose of the New Deal, according to Schlesinger, was ''to 
use democratic means somehow or other to give the plain 
34 
people a better break in a darkly confusing world." 37 The 
liberal intellectual, in his view of the common man, traveled 
38 
a long way from Babbitt to The Grapes of Wrath. 
It is reasonable to believe that upon entering the 
postwar era, liberals would have liked to have kept the same 
39 
warm regard for democracy. But the robust economy of the 
forties and fifties complicated this relationship. Schlesin-
ger explained Adlai Stevenson's defeat in 1952 by saying 
that, "Having been enabled by Democratic administrations to 
live like Republicans, the new suburbanites ended up voting 
like Republicans." 4° Furthermore, the powerful New Deal 
coalition forged in the Depression was less amicable as the 
new issues of the sixties were debated. Schlesinger defended 
Robert Kennedy in 1968 as the one candidate who could appeal 
to all the elements of the old coalition--ethnic minorities, 
37Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 
vol. 3: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1960)' p. 443. 
38Nuechterlein, "The People vs. The Interests," 
pp. 67-69. 
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40Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Which Way for the Demo-
crats?" Reporter, 20 January 1953, p. 32. 
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blue collar workers, and intellectuals. 41 But Schlesinger 
never explained what, beyond Kennedy's personality, would 
hold this coalition together. Schlesinger's hopes that 
George McGovern would perform the same feat in 1972 were 
. 1 'bl 42 even more 1mp aus1 e. 
The 1970s brought further strains on the liberals' 
efforts to retain the democratic spirit of the New Deal, 
strains which finally proved intolerable. The overwhelming 
passage of the Proposition 13 tax cuts in California in 1978, 
despite warnings of how the tax reduction would gut social 
services, was the most shocking event. Carey McWilliams, 
editorializing in the Nation, tried to be as kind to the 
California middle class as he could. Of course the decision 
to cut property taxes was a mistake, he said, but middle-
class homeowners had legitimate grievances; McWilliams sug-
gested that liberals should direct the ire of the middle 
class from the welfare state to giant corporations and the 
43 Pentagon. Liberal politicians, who had to respect the tax 
41 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of Confi-
dence: Ideas, Power, and Violence in America (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 285. 
42Nuechterlein, "Schlesinger," pp. 30-32. 
43
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p. 73. 
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revolt, may have been impressed by McWilliams's argument. 
But most liberal intellectuals were not so willing to excuse 
or accomodate the middle class, judging by the vehemence of 
two other articles. According to the New Republic's edi-
torial on the passage of Proposition 13, the motives of the 
tax cutter were elemental: "Launch the lifeboat--I'm aboard. 
44 Everybody else can swim to shore." Peter Connely wrote an 
article in Nation where he criticized those liberals, like 
McWilliams, who tried to make the best of the new tax cuts. 
He said that the tax cut movement was animated by "the ugliest 
kind of ressentiment and barely concealed racism," that it 
reflected "an America one thought blessedly gone, a country 
of raw economic greed, unmodulated by the precarious though 
real moral accomplishments of U.S. society during the past 
45 thirty years." 
The reaction to Ronald Reagan's nomination and 
election was even less restrained. Some liberals have lost 
all patience with a country capable of choosing such a leader. 
One article noted that Reagan had grown up in small mid-
western towns, "just the sort of places responsible for one 
of the raging themes of American literature, the 
44
"Me First," New Republic, 17 June 1978, p. 5. 
45 Peter Connely, "The Voice of Raw Greed," Nation 
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soul-murdering complacency of our provinces, .•• The best and 
brightest fled all our Galesburgs and Dixons, if they could, 
46 but the candidate was not among them." Another article 
called the 1980 election a "degradation ceremony" in which 
"the Americans, a sanctimonious tribe, elected a bunch of 
thugs to plunder both the public purse and the nation's 
image." 47 
Beneath this steady deterioration of the relation-
ship between liberals and the American demos one finds 
certain tangible grievances. In the 1930s, the first steps 
in creating a welfare state were popular, ~nd liberals may 
have been set up for later disillusions by the experience of 
doing well, politically, by doing good. Political victories 
in the postwar era were less frequent and less decisive; 
some liberals reacted to being rejected by the middle class 
by blaming middle-class stinginess for the difficulties of 
the welfare state. The middle class was accused of being 
opposed to programs to aid the poor because the disappear-
ance of the poor would render the social status of those 
above them tenuous. The Nation said that there was no lie 
denigrating the poor so outrageous that large numbers of 
middle-class Americans would not believe it. Welfare reform 
46E.L. Doctorow, "The Rise of Ronald Reagan," 
Nation, 19 July 1980, p. 65. 
47Alan Wolfe, in "Symposium: What Is To Be Done?" 
Nation, 22 November 1980, p. 534. 
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was hopeless under these circumstances, because shabby treat-
ment of the poor was a manifestation of basic public atti-
48 
tudes, not a departure from them. 
There is also evidence that postwar liberals felt 
estranged from the middle class on cultrual, one might almost 
say aesthetic, grounds, as well as for political reasons. An 
article in Nation in 1956 denies that there is any religiosity 
reflected in suburban church attendance: the churches that 
draw large numbers carefully avoid those Christian teachings 
that would challenge the smugness, vapidity, and materialism 
of the middle class. 49 Christopher Jencks, writing in the 
New Republic, concedes that programs for the poor should 
impart middle-class virtues "such as they are," but only 
with the understanding that these "virtues" are helpful 
devices for getting ahead in a middle class country, but have 
no intrinsic value for leading a satisfying life. 50 Among 
the questions raised by such attitudes is what sort of life 
48Adam Walinsky, "Keeping the Poor in Their Place: 
Notes on the Importance of Being One-Up," New Republic, 4 
July 1964, p. 15; William B. Rollins and Bernard Lefkowitz, 
"Welfare a la Newbergh," Nation, 16 September 1961, pp. 159-
160; Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, "Poverty, 
Injustice, and the Welfare State: Part 1: Ombudsman for the 
Poor?" Nation, 28 February 1966, pp. 230-235. 
49 Stanley Rowland, Jr., "Suburbia Buys Religion," 
Nation, 28 July 1956, pp. 78-80. 
50
christopher Jencks, "Slums and Schools--!," 
New Republic, 10 September 1962, pp. 20-21. 
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the welfare state is supposed to elevate the poor to. A 
New Republic article rejects programs that would "assimilate 
the blacks on the same materialist basis that the labor move-
ment has been assimilated," anticipating that "in a few 
51 decades blacks will be beating up on students." Presumably, 
the poor should acquire middle-class living standards without 
discarding any of their proletarian attitudes or bohemian 
folkways. Whether, or how, this is possible is not discussed 
in the writings of modern liberals. 
The tone of the liberal critique of the American 
people turned from petulant to strident in the violence of 
the late sixties. Arthur Schlesinger wrote, "We are today 
52 the most fightening people on this planet." According to 
one of the editorials in the Nation, "We not only love vio-
lence but the more killing we can do, at a distance and with 
a minimum of risk, the better we like it."53 Though the 
provocations were severe, particularly for Schlesinger when 
John and Robert Kennedy were killed, the descent of liberal 
analysis into moralism, "the tendency to reduce political 
51Michael M:·: les, "Candidates and Cities," New 
Republic, 13 July 1968, p. 21. 
52 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "America 1968: 
Politics of Violence," Harper's, August 1968, p. 19. 
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issues to moral terms and to arrange and comprehend those 
terms in such polarized fashion as to preclude complexity of 
analysis," is one of the least admirable developments of 
. l"b 1" 54 Amer1can 1 era 1sm. 
It might be supposed that the violence in ghettos 
and campuses would also have been condemned as frightening. 
In fact, the liberal reaction to violence by those who had 
been rejected by the American middle class, such as blacks, 
or who had rejected that class, like student leftists, was 
milder, even sympathetic. Student revolts, said Schlesinger, 
were caused by the rigidity of university bureaucracies. 
"Both Berkeley and Columbia will be wiser and better univer-
sities as a result of the student revolts." 55 An assessment 
of the Black Panthers in the Nation can be fairly described 
as sycophantic: 
The Black Panther Party is, by any definition a 
revolutionary group, one which is attempting to find--
and to a surprising extent has succeeded in finding--
revolutionary political theories which are applicable to 
the condition of black people in America today, particu-
larly in urban America. Its synthesis of Mao and Malcolm, 
Fanon and Lenin (with the important addition of Cleaver's 
and Newton's own contributions) is no street hoodlum's 
hodgepodge but a careful winnowing of political thought. 
54Nuechterlein, "Schlesinger," p. 27. 
55
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Their analysis of the role of the police in white repres-
sion is accurate and brilliant.56 
Many liberals' reaction to the backlash against 
crime, riots, and demonstrations was as hysterical as the 
analysis of the riots and demonstrations was dispassionate 
and soothing. The Nation's reasoning was that the enormous 
gap between our races and classes guaranteed a revolution. 
By the sixties the black revolution was already underway; 
it could elicit either a good or a bad revolution among 
whites. It was possible that whites would react to the black 
revolution by finally insisting on racial justice, and would 
become determined to heal the wounds of racism at all costs. 
But the more probable outcome was far uglier. "Present odds 
are on the Fascist revolution, although it too is in an early 
and perhaps still reversible stage. But as the radio com-
mentators used to say in the 1930s, it is later than you 
think." 57 Schlesinger, too, glimpsed a police state on the 
horizon when he contemplated those who would deal with crime 
by hiring more policemen, placing fewer restrictions on their 
actions, and putting tougher judges on the bench. 58 
56Gene Marine, "Mao, Malcolm, Fanon, and Lenin," 
review of Picking Up the Gun, by Earl Anthony, in Nation, 
16 March 1970, p. 313. See also Elmer Bendiner, "America 
Absurd," review of Hell's Angels, by Hunter Thompson, in 
Nation, 3 April 1967, pp. 441-442, which tries to like the 
motorcycle gang for its "rough and ready anti-establishment 
fervor." 
57
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Liberals can hardly he held completely responsible 
for the decline in the relationship with the American people 
that had been so close in the thirties. The history of the 
postwar era, particularly the 1960s, eroded many other, 
stronger, political relationships. Still, it is hard to 
disagree with Nuechterlein's assessment that ''liberals made 
the worst of a bad situation." 59 It should not be so dif-
ficult for liberals to accept that their program will be 
more appealing to America sometimes than others, and to 
defend and refine their agenda while waiting for the lean 
years to pass. The venom of liberal writings on the people 
and the middle class in particular suggests two things. 
First, liberals had an exaggerated idea of the depth of the 
commitment America made to liberalism in the thirties, and 
did not appreciate the extent to which it was based on a 
coincidence of goals. Because of this exaggeration, liberals 
interpreted their season in political disfavor as the vio-
lation of a trust, and reacted with inordinate fury. That 
a great many Americans were unwilling to follow liberals 
wherever they led, even to Black Panther meetings, should 
have been even less surprising, yet it provoked still more 
outrage. Second, liberals have not thought clearly enough 
about their own place in American democracy. Liberals do 
59Neuchterlein, "Schlesinger," p. 
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seem to know that they are not simply populists, enthusias-
tically endorsing whatever it is the people want to do at 
any moment. And it seems clear that their convictions are 
not so inviolate that they would prefer being voices in the 
wilderness to taking account of a broad shift in American 
opinion. But beyond these thoughts, liberals have not 
wrestled with the question of how to navigate the wide 
spectrum between being totally principled and totally 
expedient. There seems to be no agreement on which of their 
goals are the more and less important, or on how to defend 
their goals to a skeptical citizenry. Until they have 
thought deeply about these questions, liberals cannot make 
the most persuasive defense of their position. And without 
their having made the effort to become more persuasive 
rhetoricians, it is particularly objectionable when liberals 
pass facile and demeaning judgments on their countrymen. 
IV 
We can fairly characterize the basic liberal view 
of American government by saying that liberals favor a strong 
federal government, and have generally looked to the presi-
dency to be the dominant influence within the federal 
government. Arthur Schlesinger's pre-Watergate writings on 
the presidency were confident and unequivocal in their pre-
ference for the executive. "The American political system, 
44 
~hough misconceived by some as made up of three coordinate 
branches of equal powers, has worked best as a presidential 
system. Only strong Presidents have been able to overcome 
the tendencies towards inertia inherent in a structure so 
60 
cunningly composed of checks and balances." He tells us 
later in the same collection of essays: 
An adequate democratic theory will recognize that 
democracy is not self-executing; that leadership is not 
the enemy of self-government but the means by which it 
can be made to work; and that Caeserism has been more 
often produced by the failure of weak governments than 
by the success of strong ones.61 
For Schlesinger, like most liberals of his generation, FDR 
was the model of the vigorous chief executive who made 
American democracy work. But Schlesinger had gone all the 
way back to Andrew Jackson to find historical precedents for 
Roosevelt's style of governing in his second book, The Age 
of Jackson. The theme of this work was that Jackson set 
the model of the "militant democratic leader" to whom the 
American people have always turned when conservative courts 
and legislatures refuse to deal with economic crises. 62 
Vietnam complicated the serene liberal appraisal of 
the presidency, and Watergate demolished it. Schlesinger 
60
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61 Ibid., p. 21. 
62Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Legacy of Andrew 
Jackson, American Mercury, February 1947, pp. 170-172. See 
also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: 
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himself is the best indicator of this process; his book 
The Imperial Presidency was published in the middle of the 
watergate crisis; and perfectly captured the deep misgivings 
about the power of the executive branch of that time. It 
is clear that Schlesinger takes a more sober view of the 
executive branch in this work. He admits some personal 
responsibility for the rise of "presidential mystique," and 
goes so far as to say that FDR was "a flawed, willful, and, 
with time, increasingly arbitrary man."63 But beyond this, 
Schlesinger's revised thesis about the presidency is quite 
unclear. He has not jettisoned his earlier views. He still 
regards the presidency as "the most effective instrumentality 
of government for justice and progress," and warns that the 
schemes of "presidential subordination could easily be pres-
sed to the point of national folly."64 This dilemma is pre-
sumably to be resolved by contending "not for a strong 
Presidency in general, but for a strong Presidency within 
the Constitution."65 But at the same time, "The effective 
means of controlling the Presidency lay less in law than in 
politics."66 There are no systems of constraints, legal or 
63Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presi-
dency, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. ix, 409. 
64Ibid. , pp. 404, 405. 
65Ibid. , p. 405. 
66 Ibid., p. 410. 
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political, that will guarantee a strong predisency for a 
Franklin Roosevelt but a weak one for a Richard Nixon; the 
tergiversations of The Imperial Presidency suggest that·many 
liberals have not come to terms with this fact. 67 
The importance of the presidency to liberals has a 
psychological basis as well as a political one. It is fair 
to say that liberals have been conspicuous in the way they 
have responded to bold and appealing leadership. Schlesinger, 
again, is most prominent as a believer in what might be 
called the alchemy of leadership, the art of transforming 
political situations by the force of personality. Franklin 
Roosevelt was, of course, the master, but Adlai Stevenson, 
John Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy a11 shared this quality. 
RFK in particular had Roosevelt's capacities to empathize 
with others, and to illuminate tangled political conflicts, 
according to Schlesinger. 68 Liberals' attraction to leader-
ship style would be unremarkable if it were merely in the 
service of the liberal agenda, but it often seems a value 
apart from, even opposed to, the liberal program. Martin 
points out that liberals overlooked Adlai Stevenson's 
67 See also Edward Pessen, "The Arrogant Veto," 
Nation, 30 August 1975, pp. 133-137. 
68Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 
vol. 2: The Coming of hte New Deal (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1959), p. 586; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert 
Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 
pp. 799' 891. 
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political caution and reluctance to antagonize the South on 
civil rights. He was forgiven because of his cerebral style, 
sense of humor, and skill at the podium. By contrast Harry 
Truman was much less popular with liberals of his day, though 
. 69 
substantively he was much closer to them than was Stevenson. 
The liberal sources used in this dissertation devote 
very little attention to the role and powers of Congress, ex-
cept as these are the obvious complement of their writings on 
the presidency. Liberals have devoted a little more attention 
to the role of the judiciary, but their writings do not point 
to a consensus view, notwithstanding that the judicial activism 
of the Warren Court was routinely called "liberal." It is note-
worthy that Alexander Bickel, prominent advocate of judicial 
restraint, was a contributing editor of the New Republic, for 
the last fifteen years of his life. In its pages he argued 
that "society at large ought to participate in the venture of 
governing itself," and cannot do so when the courts practice 
"the confident, single-minded imposition of solutions to prob-
lems of the first magnitude." 70 Bickel's influence led others 
at the magazine to argue for a limited role for the judges, as 
in an editorial arguing that Roe v. Wade was a mistake, and 
69Martin, Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism, 
pp. 99-100. See also Richard J. Whalen, Catch the Falling 
Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 108. 
70 Alexander M. Bickel, "Close of the Warren Era," 
New Republic 12 July 1969, pp. 15-16. 
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71 that the abortion issue should have been left to the states. 
At the Nation, however, Roe v. Wade was praised, and the 
supreme Court was criticized for refusing to insist on the 
reorganization of public school financing. 72 Similarly, 
Joseph Raub, a leading figure in the ADA, found the whole 
controversy over judicial activism pointless--judges were 
policy makers, too, he said, and should have the same lee-
way as those in the executive and legislative branches. 73 
Liberals are much less divided on the question of 
federalism. They have regularly favored assigning a govern-
ing function to the federal government that others believe 
should be given to, or left with, the states. Several paths 
lead to this conclusion. Some liberals argue that the federal 
government is more efficient than states and localities. 
Only the federal government can surmount economies of scale 
to undertake the policy experimentation and analysis needed 
for progress. Local and even state governments cannot deal 
with problems that transcend arbitrarily drawn boundary 
71
"Abortion," New Republic, 10 February 1973, p. 9. 
72 
"Jane Roe and Mary Doe," Nation, 5 Ff'bruary 1973, 
p. 165; John E. Coons, "In a Manner Restrained," Nation, 30 
April 1973, p. 556. 
73 Joseph Raub, "The Chief," review of Earl Warren: 
A Public Life, by G. Edward White, New Republic, 9 August 
1982, p. 32. 
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lines, problems like pollution, mass transit, and industrial 
development. The record of the federal government compares 
very favorably to the states•. 74 
Other liberals argue that the federal government is 
a more equitable source of policy in a modern economy. For 
one thing, federal revenues are derived largely from an 
income tax that is at least nominally progressive and is 
capable of being made more so. By contrast, state govern-
ments rely heavily on sales taxes, and local governments on 
property taxes, both of which are regressive. The federal 
government alone, then, is in a position to fund needed pro-
grams without burdening those who can least afford it. 
Furthermore, it is only at the federal level that the influ-
ence of private interests on public policy is most diluted. 
Mining interests will have less influence on the U.S. Congress 
than on the West Virginia legislature, making a just and 
prudent federal policy more likely. 75 
The arguments for centralized policy-making on the 
74Myron Lieberman, "Four Myths Cripple Our Schools," 
Nation, 28 February 1959, pp. 179-182; Amitai Etzioni and 
Marina Ottaway, "The Next Domestic Disaster," Nation, 29 
January 1973, pp. 140-141; Gilbert A. Harrison, "Carry Me 
Back: Some Notes on Barry Goldwater," New Republic, 27 
March 1961, p. 16. 
75
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Harry W. Ernst, "Federal Aid or Local Taxes?" Nation, 4 June 
1960, p. 492; Grant McConnell, '~ig Government Bo~y: Who'd 
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grounds of efficiency and equity are plausible, but a third 
argument is more ambitious but less compelling. Speaking 
directly to the enterprise of the welfare state, it claims 
that the federal government is more benevolent than others. 
A New Republic article claims that "local and state elec-
torates" have repeatedly shown their aversion to paying for 
a better school system. Thus, "friends of education have 
called for massive federal aid." 76 In the same vein, another 
article charges that local school boards are not "manifes-
tations of Jeffersonian democracy," but havens for "ambitious 
politicians and irate taxpayers who would rather keep the 
local property tax down than provide children with decent 
education." 77 And if localities cannot be trusted to tax 
themselves, they cannot be trusted either to spend tax 
dollars collected by the federal government: there is 
scarcely a good word to be found for revenue sharing in the 
writings of liberals. 78 
76
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There is something odd about attacks on "state and 
local electorates." Such groups are presumably distinguish-
able from the "national electorate," yet it is undeniable that 
electorates at all levels of American politics are comprised 
of the same citizens. Is it suggested that these citizens 
change their politics between elections, or even when moving 
from one part of the ballot to another? I find no evidence 
that any liberal has ever confronted this argument, but one 
can discern that some liberals sense that added federal 
power is in need of a broader justification. This is to be 
found by invoking the national interest as a reason for 
turning to the national government: 
We are a nation. Connecticut citizens do have an interest 
in the quality of rivers in Massachusetts, of highways 
in Wyoming, schools in Mississippi, and life in Harlem. 
We cannot leave it wholly up to 50 state legislatures to 
determine whether and h9w national resources are used 
to meet national needs. ~ 
If the idea of a discernible state electorate can be clari-
fied, the explanation may lie in the idea of the national 
interest. Perhaps truly national problems affect Americans 
as Americans, and cause them to elect federal officials on 
different criteria than they employ in thinking about state 
and local matters, where their interests are more prosaic. 80 
and Means Committee of the House of Representatives. ADA 
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This explanation, if it does in fact capture the 
liberal outlook on the issue, still suffers from two diffi-
culties. First, liberals should define in greater detail 
what they mean by the national interest. It is not enough 
to say that citizens in Connecticut have an interest in the 
highways in Wyoming. Presumably, the citizens of Wyoming 
have an even deeper interest in them, as well as a better 
idea of how to care for them. Might it not be better for 
the citizens of Wyoming to act on their more serious concern 
for their highways through the state government, than for 
the citizens of Connecticut to act on their concern through 
the national government? To put the same point another way, 
is it sufficient to establish that a problem involves the 
national interest if it can be shown that it transcends state 
boundaries? Is there any aspect of life in Wyoming--or 
Harlem or Mississippi--that has no impact at all on resi-
dents of Connecticut, and is thereby an appropriate concern 
of the state legislatures? It is hard to escape the suspi-
cion in considering these questions that for many liberals 
the liberal agenda is the national interest. This, too, 
may be a defensible position. But it means that efforts to 
justify the liberal agenda by appealing to the national 
interest simply beg the question. 
The second problem with the liberal preference for, 
and justification of, a stronger federal government is its 
anti-democratic implication. Our nation of 230 million has 
53 
537 elected federal officials. As a rule, a citizen can vote 
for only five of them: President, Vice President, two Sena-
tors, and one Representative. State and local officials are 
far more numerous, both in the aggregate and in relation to 
the voters. To be sure, the importance and visibility of 
federal officials may introduce a qualitative depth to their 
relations with constitutients that compensates for the quanti-
tative differences. Still, it is not unreasonable to believe 
that one reason liberals favor the federal government is that 
it is insulated to some extent from democratic pressures, 
because federal elected officials have some leeway vis-a-vis 
their constituents, and because unelected federal officials--
bureaucrats--have some leeway vis-a-vis the elected ones. 
Acknowledging such a goal should not be destructive to 
liberalism. The Federalist Papers frankly admitted that the 
Constitution had elements that restrained, delayed, and 
moderated the forces of democracy; and the project of Madison 
and Hamilton, far more ambitious than modern liberalism's 
was not undone. But liberals have made it difficult for 
themselves to openly assume the position taken by Madison 
and Hamilton. For all the denigrating remarks about the 
American people in recent years, there is no evidence of a 
liberal reassessment of the idea of democracy. To assert 
frankly that the welfare state should be subject to the 
mediated rather than the direct judgment of the American 
54 
people would probably discomfit many liberals as an "elitist" 
argument. It is preferable to find other grounds for vindi-
cating federal authority than to admit there is a prospec-
tive conflict between liberal benevolence and liberal 
populism. 
v 
A final aspect of the liberal attitude towards 
American government needs to be considered. Having examined 
how liberals view the relationships between the people and 
government, among the various levels of government, and among 
the various branches of the federal government, it remains 
to be seen how they understand the relationship between th3 
public and private sector. Liberals are often attacked for 
advocating "Big Government." One liberal response is that 
it is a necessary counterweight to big business: 
If the basic decisions are to be made either in a direc-
tors' boardroom or in a government agency, then the 
political process permits us a measure of access, at 
least, to a governmental agency. Big government, for 
all its dangers, remains democracy's only effective 
response to big business--especially when big business 
behaves with such political rsrklessness as it has 
behaved in the United States. 
The giant corporation has gone far to escape the discipline 
of the marketplace, through research, marketing, and diversi-
fication. Thus disencumbered, corporate directors have great 
leeway in their decision-making. To relentlessly oppose 
81
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the growth of Big Government is to simply acquiesce to such 
private power, and in all the social consequences of its use. 
The expansion of government, liberals have agreed, con~ronts 
the semi-autonomous corporate sector with a democratic adver-
82 
sary. 
Liberals find other merits in the public sector. 
Schlesinger, perhaps as an historian of the New Deal, is 
emphatic on this point. Only by using an excessively 
abstract notion of freedom, he says, can one sustain the 
claim that the welfare state has incurred on liberty. The 
"freedom" to despoil the environment, discriminate against 
minorities, and exploit labor are well ended. Further, the 
government has been more efficient in the pursuit of its 
goals than it is given credit for. The growth of government 
has been accompanied by an increase in the number of techni-
cians and experts working for the government, making possible 
a steady improvement in the performance of the public sector. 
In any case, large organizations, public and private, all 
exhibit the deficiencies of bureaucracy, and it is hardly 
83 fair to single out the government. 
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It would be incorrect to leave the impression that 
all liberals, or liberals generally, have been completely 
sanguine about Big Government. Some liberals, sensitive to 
the charge that too much power has been concentrated in 
Washingotn, try to turn the argument around. Liberals have 
been more adept at the conservative goal of decentralization 
than conservatives, they claim. Liberals have tried to return 
power to the people, with New Deal programs like the TVA 
and Great Society programs like community action, where 
conservatives only seem to return power to those who are 
84 
already powerful. Nonetheless, the possibility that federal 
controls can ossify, that some government undertakings are 
unproductive or even counterproductive, does not go unacknow-
ledged. Indiscriminate conservative attacks on the welfare 
state are bound to be right at least occasionally. 85 
The other conservative charge often made about Big 
Government is that, in addition to jeapordizing liberty, its 
profligacy will wreck the economy. Liberals disagree. Some 
of them point out that throughout the economic miracle of 
postwar West Germany, the proportion of its national income 
84 
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spent by government was larger than in the U.S. or in other 
west European countries where the economy grew at a slower 
86 pace. Others argue that a nation as prosperous as America 
can afford to achieve all the liberal goals, if only she 
wills it: "The truth is that this country can, within 
extremely broad limits, afford anything it chooses, ••• The 
real issue is how serious the Administration, Congress, and 
the comfortable (and large) middle classes are about licking 
87 poverty.'' The liberal agenda, whatever its cost, is cheap 
compared to the consequences of failing to address the 
88 problems of the poor. 
This argument, that poverty is a problem so severe 
that the criteria of cost and performance must be relaxed, 
was made with some frequency by liberals in the aftermath 
of the Great Society, when there were many calls for limiting 
the commitment to the welfare state. "This country cannot 
not afford the [elimination of poverty]. Whatever else may 
be sacrificed, the money needed to tackle the grave social 
problems of an increasingly complex society must be found." 89 
86Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "Confessions of a One-Time 
Conservative," New Republic, 29 May 1961, p. 10; Morton 
Kondracke, "The German Challenge to American Conservatives," 
New Republic, 29 September 1979, pp. 16-21. 
87
"Nixon's Affluence," New Republic, 30 August 1969, 
p. 8. 
88
william Serrin, "Who Cares About Rebuilding the 
City?" New Republic, 4 May 1968, p. 11. 
89
"Nixon's Affluence," p. 8. 
58 
Of course, even by the late sixties a considerable sum had 
already been spent in anti-poverty programs, and the results 
were often dissapointing. It has been argued by some liberals 
that federal programs to help the poor faced such forbidding 
problems that even minor gains cannot be dismissed. If only 
a few Job Corps trainees or Head Start students make gains, 
this is still a valuable improvement over the tragic situa-
90 
tion where no one emerges from the ghetto. 
In addition to using social policies to alleviate 
poverty, liberals have argued, for most of the postwar era, 
that through macroeconomic policy the government can insure 
the expansion of the economy and of the labor market that the 
fight against poverty requires. Such a view is nothing but 
orthodox Keynesianism, and until the 1970s, American liberals 
were among its most faithful adherents. Edwin L. Dale sum-
marized the liberal outlook with sweeping confidence in the 
New Republic: 
The way to achieve the best of all economic worlds 
(rapid growth, full employment, stable prices, favorable 
balance of payments, more investment, no recessions, 
better living standards) is to spend as much government 
money as possible, and make sure that the amount the 
government spends rises rapidly each year. 
The reason for this is not that government spending 
90 Colman McCarthy, "The Job on the Job Corps," New 
Republic, 5 July 1969, pp. 19-21; "Poor Education," New 
Republic, 21 March 1970, p. 9. 
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is inherently better than private spending, though that 
may be true. The reason is that a very high level of 
government spending, no matter where the money goes, 
assures a very high level of demand. And a high level 
of demand is the open sesame to everything else. 91 
It is not surprising that those who can entertain 
the possibility that public spending might be inherently 
better than private spending do not emphasize the importance 
of profits. The argument more likely to be made by liberals 
is that excessive profits are the cause of economic stagna-
tion. High profits either depress the wage level or inflate 
the price level; both developments lead to an inadequate level 
of aggregate demand, and, ultimately to a recesison. There 
are no circumstances, then, under which a higher tax on pro-
fits is a bad idea. When inflation is a problem, higher t~xes 
can yield a counter-inflationary budget surplus. When un-
employment is the concern, the base for a profits tax will 
shrink, and the resulting deficit spending will stimulate 
the economy. It cannot be said with finality that liberals 
are utterly indifferent to the importance of retained earn-
ings in economic expansion. But they say very little about 
it, and a good deal more about how the government can make 
better use of profits than the enterprises that have 
91 Dale, "Confessions," pp. 9-10. See also Confer-
ence on Economic Progress, "Twoard Full Employment and 
Production," New Republic, 9 August 1954, p. 9; Schlesinger, 




There is another, more potent way in which liberal 
economic analysis supports the liberal political agenda. 
An article in the ADA World makes the point explicitly: 
Greater equality in the distribution of income is not 
merely a requirement of justice in a free society; it 
is a necessary condition for the maintenance of full 
production and full employment.93 
The redistribution of income has a clear macroeconomic 
rationale for those who see the regulation of aggregate 
demand as the key to prosperity. If more income went to 
poor families, their tendency to spend a very high propor-
tion of their income would increase the overall demand for 
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Liberals' welfare state goals are at once obvious and 
mystifying. Liberals seek to do good. President Roosevelt's 
1944 State of the Union address is the most direct statement 
of these intentions. "We may not be content, no matter how 
high the general standard of living may be," he said, "if 
some fraction of our people--whether it be one-third or one-
fifth or one tenth--is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and 
insecure." 1 To avoid this he proposed "a second Bill of 
Rights," which included "the right to a useful and remunera-
tive job," "the right to earn enough to provide adequate food 
and clothing and recreation," "the right of every family to 
a decent home; the right to adequate medical care and the 
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; the right to 
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sick-
ness, accident, and unemployment; the right to a good educa-
tion."2 But these simple, charitable impulses do not define 
1Eugene J. McCarthy, A Liberal Answer to the Conser-
vative Challenge (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 40-41. 
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a clear political program. It is not easy to say what the 
motivations or ultimate purposes of liberal charity are, or 
how other goals can accomodate the welfare state and its 
budget, or how strong the rights to economic security are, 
or how they are related to other ri~hts. 
Liberal activists, writers, and intellectuals of 
the postwar era have not tried to answer these questions. 
Apparently, they have not felt that it was important to answer 
them, for in the literature in which postwar liberalism 
expresses itself, the wisdom of the Second Bill of Rights is 
not questioned, and the only interesting pr,oblems raised in 
connection with it are the political problems of getting it 
enacted and funded. As the ADA expressed itself on this 
point: 
ADA believes that every American has a right to public 
protection from personal socio-economic catastrophe 
resulting from sickness, disability, unemployment, or 
age. These services must be given without harassment, 
humiliation, or unwarranted restrictions.3 
With these goals, the most important word for modern liberals 
has been "more"--more government money for education, health, 
housing, and income maintenance, more government programs to 
help the disadvantaged. Accordingly, liberals have banished 
"less" or "enough" from the domestic policy vocabulary. 
People who use such words about the welfare state don't 
3 Preamble, ADA Papers, Series 4, number 65. 
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realize that America's domestic crises could tear the nation 
apart, or that admonitions to individuals to provide for them-
selves through private insurance or savings are cruel and 
hollow, or that present levels of government parsimony demean 
and deny needy Americans. 4 
It is clear that the liberal agenda requires a pros-
perous economy--! know of no suggestion by any liberal that 
a poor country can transform itself into a rich one by in-
creased welfare state spending. 5 In the late 1940s, when the 
influence of Keynes on American liberals was strongest, it 
was assumed that prosperity required the liberal agenda. We 
have noted the happy discovery by liberals that their agenda 
would strengthen aggregate demand and ensure prosperity. When 
the economy boomed in the 1950s, despite failure to enact 
most of their programs, liberals had to reconsider their 
position on the relation between social spending and pros-
perity. Some liberals argued that in the new affluent society 
prosperity could be more or less assumed, and that liberals 
4
"Poverty Cuts," New Republic, 13 July 1968, p. 8; 
"Medical Care for the Aged," New Republic, 7 March 1960, p. 
5; Louis H. Henry, "Caring for Our Aged Poor," New Republic, 
22 May 1971, p. 22; "Feeding the Poor," New Republic, 30 
October 1971, pp. 10-11; "State of the Union: A Program for 
Liberal America," New Republic, 10 January 1949, p. 13. 
5
see, for example, Leon Keyser1ing, "Eggheads and 
Politics," New Republic, 27 October 1958, pp. 14-15. 
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should insist that at any particular level of prosperity the 
overall health of society was now better served by govern-
ment provision of public goods than by the limitless increase 
6 
of consumer goods. Others argued that liberals should con-
tinue to stress the prime importance of economic growth: 
An increase of one percentage point in the national rate 
of economic growth solves far more problems of human 
misery, insofar as they stem from unemployment or low 
income, than all the retraining programs, union resist-
ance to automation, poverty programs, distressed-area 
programs and the rest put together. This is not to 
oppose the programs aimed at tackling special cases, but 
to put them in perspective: All put together, they can-
not accomplish nearly as much good as a difference 
between $40 billion and $30 billion in the growth of the 
Gross National Product.7 
The distinction between advocates of growth and 
advocates of redistribution did not amount to more than a 
difference of emphasis within liberalism for most of the 
postwar era. There was nothing politically attractive about 
criticizing economic growth, and to have moved very far in 
the advocacy of economic growth as a substitute for the wel-
fare state would have been to echo American conservatives. 
Liberals tended, then, to advocate both an expanding pie 
and a larger slice for the welfare state. No single policy 
combines both these emphases better than government guarantees 
6John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 2nd 
edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 152. 
7Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "The Big Gun on Poverty," 
New Republic, 7 August 1965, p. 14. See also Keyserling, 
"Eggheads," pp. 13-17. 
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of full employment. Liberals favored the Full Employment 
Act of 1946, regretted Congress's deletions of provisions that 
would have required government policies that guaranteed iull 
employment, and favored efforts to reinstate such provisions 
through the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill in the 
seventies. In both decades, many liberals answered questions 
about the government's capacity to actually achieve full 
employment by saying that the urgency of the goal justified 
any risks in trying to attain it. 8 
Other liberals have acknowledged that macroeconomic 
policy is a clumsy tool for promoting full employment--
guaranteeing private sector jobs for the least employable will 
require levels of government stimulus that could unhinge the 
economy. For that reason, full employment policies are going 
to require large programs of direct hiring by the government, 
as in the New Deal's Works Progress Administration. By what-
ever means, full employment is imperative. Without it, all 
other welfare problems are insoluble. With it, liberals have 
maintained, we can finally distinguish the victims of a mal-
functioning economy from those who cannot lead decent lives 
9 
without direct income and services from the government. 
8 Speed the Murray Bill!" Nation, 25 August 1945, 
p. 169; "Wary of Welfare," New Republic, 5 June 1976, pp. 3-
4. See also Dorothy R. Steffens, "The Promise of Humphrey-
Hawkins," Nation, 21 January 1978, pp. 50-52. 
9
christopher Jencks, "Johnson vs. Poverty," New 
Republic, 28 March 1964, pp. 17-18; nAnd the Jobless," Nation, 
22 February 1977, pp. 228-229; Rep. John Conyers, Jr., "The 
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Virtually all liberals believe that the market 
economy is incapable of generating full employment and economic 
security; the government will have to act vigorously to cor-
rect its deficiencies. But it is possible to distinguish 
liberals who favor more government activity as a goal in 
itself from others for whom a prominent, active public sector 
is only a means to the goals of a gentler, more equitable 
society. Those whom we might call "left-wing liberals" 
believe that the ultimate goal of liberalism should be a 
planned economy. In their view, capitalism's problems are 
deeper than the business cycles or maldistribution of income. 
Capitalism directs resources towards their greatest profit, 
but a planned economy would direct them towards the greatest 
needs. More low-cost housing would be built because, despite 
the smaller profit margin, the need for such housing is 
greater. Similarly, the search for a non-inflationary economic 
policy to reduce unemployment (or, conversely, a policy to 
fight inflation that does not create a recession) is hopeless. 
The free market economy is incapable of performing so well, 
these liberals argue. Only mandatory, permanent, wage and 
price controls can deliver a stable economy. 10 
Real Problem is Poverty," Nation, 24 January 1976, p. 83; 
John J. Corson, "Social Security Needs Modernizing," New 
Republic, 8 May 1950, p. 12; Nick Katz, "The Politics of 
Welfare Reform," New Republic, 14 May 1977, p. 19. 
10
"State of the Union," New Republic, 10 January 
1949, p. 3; Henry Wallace. "Trust Busters and Planners," 
New Republic, 8 September 1947, pp. 14-15; Melville J. Ulmer, 
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For the liberals who place so high a value on the 
transformation of America's political economy, liberalism 
itself makes sense only as a stage in that transformation, 
not as a permanent structure of reformed capitalism. As fast 
as the political education of Americans will allow, they argue, 
liberals must proceed from compensating for capitalism's 
defects to replacing capitalism itself. If they are to do 
this, liberals must never lose track of the inevitable link 
between their own sentiments and the socialist agenda. In a 
1974 article in Nation, Michael Harrington argued that the 
policies preferred by liberals are "socialist in all respects 
save one--they do not mention socialism. They are for the 
redistribution of wealth, for government intervention on 
behalf of the poor, minorities and working people, and for 
the extension of public ownership."ll 
Other liberals are skeptical about being a way 
station to socialism, both because they have misgivings about 
socialism itself, and because of their aversion to ideological 
rigidity. Arthur Schlesinger may be regarded as representa-
tive of this viewpoint. He insists that liberals must pursue 
a mixed economy that is neither distinctly capitalist nor 
"Jobs, Inflation, and Liberal Politics," New Republic, 20 
March 1976, p. 8. 
11Michael Harrington, "Say What You Mean--Social-
ism," Nation, 25 May 1974, p. 649. See also George Soule, 
"The Full Employment Bill," New Republic, 6 August 1945, pp. 
154-156; I.F. Storle, "Will America Be Socialist?" Nation, 
11 August 1945, pp. 124-125. 
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socialist. Schlesinger doubts that political freedom can 
withstand the concentration of economic power. And he 
thinks that the administrative difficulties of a centrally 
directed economy are excessive. He feels that it is those 
to his left who do not take the humane goals of liberalism 
seriously enough, and seek institutional change for its own 
12 
sake. 
These "centrist" liberals are unquestionably 
skeptical about free markets, but they alRo acknowledge the 
role a pricing system plays in the transmission of impor-
tant economic information. "Bureaucratic decisions can 
never anticipate all the economic contingencies which a 
free market holds in some kind of harmony ••.• We only know 
that a completely free market lacks the self-regulating 
power once ascribed to it and that too inclusive planning 
destroys the flexibility which a health economy requires." 13 
The solution is for the government to determine the economic 
framework and secure the general level of performance, then 
let the private sector determine the details within these 
boundaries. "The state should aim at establishing condi-
tions for economic decisions, not at making all the decisions 
12
schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 39-
70. See also Schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 150-151; Robert 
Lekachman, "Income and Welfare," review of The Ethics of 
Redistribution, by Bertrand de Jouvenel, in Nation, 14 June 
1952, p. 584 
13Reinhold Niebuhr, "Halfway to What?" p. 28. 
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itself •••• it should expend its main strength (l) in 
determining the broad level and conditions of economic acti-
vity through indirect means and (2) in making a success of 
projects clearly its own responsibility."14 
In this formulation the welfare state will be a 
continuing necessity; the private sector will never live 
up to the standards a wise government will set for the 
economy. Consequently, the government must act, by one 
means or another, to ensure that the deficiencies are made 
up. It must, for example, determine how many new houses 
will be needed over a period of five or ten years, and 
then stand ready to build whatever portion of that number 
the construction industry does not. Similarly, the federal 
government should establish goals for economic expansion and 
job creation, and then employ all those who cannot find 
. b . th . t t 15 JO s 1n e pr1va e sec or. 
Whatever the degree of enthusiasm they harbor for 
the growth of government, liberals seem united in their 
preference for higher taxes. Infinitely higher? The possi-
bility of excessive taxation is occasionally noted, but not 
without a quick insistence that we are nowhere close to 
such a problem. As Keynsians, liberals have been sanguine 
14schi.~singer, Vi tal Center,' pp. 182-183, 185. 
15
"Ten Million New Homes, New Republic, 27 August 
1945, p. 237; "Is It Full Employment?" New Republic, 18 
February 1946, p. 240. 
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about deficit spending which can be accomplished through 
cutting taxes as well as increasing spending. They invari-
ably prefer the letter method. Because a democracy is not 
an easy place to be identified as the inveterate advocates 
of higher taxes, liberals' rhetoric on taxes is often pre-
occupied with "closing loopholes." Though many of the 
loopholes turn out, on examination, to be such boons to 
the middle class as the deductibility of mortgage interest, 
the impression meant to be left by this rhetorical slant 
is that other people's taxes--wealthier people's taxes--are 
the ones that will be raised. 16 
Another unpleasant consequence of more government 
activity is the debasement of the currency. It was at one 
time possible for liberals to speak evenly of accepting 
higher inflation in order to reduce unemployment. Their 
confidence reflected the beliefs that inflation and unemploy-
ment were on a rigid seesaw, and that full employment was 
the fundamental goal of domestic policy. The experience in 
the sixties and seventies of rising inflation, accompanied 
by rising unemployment, drove the advocacy of inflation out 
of liberals' rhetoric. As early as 1970 one could read in 
the New Republic that a 3!% inflation rate was intolerable. 
Solving inflation was another problem. Except for those 
16Howe, "The Right Menace," p. 17; "Tax Reform," 
New Republic, 9 January 1961, pp. 11-12; Irving Kristol, 
Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 
pp. 202-210. 
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who remained confident about wage and price controls, an 
increasingly lonely group, it was hard to find liberals 
willing to say anything about inflation; one of ADA's 
officers called it "the black hole of liberal politics--
touch it and you disappear." 17 
II 
Liberals are, then, proponents of charitable works 
who are willing, and in some case eager, to see the govern-
ment exercise more power and resources in the pursuit of 
these goals, and who are, or have been, willing to accept 
higher taxes and inflation to attain these charitable pur-
poses. It remains to be seen whether modern liberals see 
good works as a medial or ultimate goal. We may begin by 
noting that since most liberals are unwilling to trust 
economic expansion alone to provide for the poor, assisting 
the poor through a welfare state will entail some degree of 
income redistribution: the government must take money from 
some and give it to others, and the donors will presumably, 
as a rule, be wealthier than the recipients. The relation-
ship between welfare and redistribution in liberal thought 
is unclear, however. It could be that redistribution is 
17
navid Gelman et al, "Wanted: A Liberal Agenda," 
Newsweek, 30 March 1981, p. Sl; Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "The 
Case Against a Tax Increase," New Republic, 2 April 1966, 
pp. 11-13; Melville Ulmer, "Economic Slowdown," New Republic, 
28 February 1970, p. 11. 
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nothing more than a by-product of alleviating poverty, but 
we need to consider as well the possibility that redistribu-
tion of income is a separate goal within liberal thinking, 
one that is either a companion to liberals' welfare goals, 
or the ultimate goal to which the welfare goals are directed. 
We may begin by noting the contention made by some 
liberals that economic inequality reinforces and perpetuates 
the welfare problems liberals are determined to solve. 
Christopher Jencks, for example, has argued that attempts 
to improve public education for the poor founder on political 
obstacles, obstacles created by the inequality of American 
society. Middle-class and upper-class parents don't want an 
equal education for their children--they want a superior 
education so their children will have an advantage in the 
job market. When these parents cannot prevent the poor from 
getting a better education they try to retain their children's 
comparative position by improving their education to a 
corresponding degree. Galbraith has argued, similarly, 
that economic growth is particularly advantageous to the 
upper classes, that it continuously strengthens the posi-
tion of those who already wield decisive political and 
economic power. The goals of helping the poor cannot, 
therefore, be reconciled with any thoughts of leaving the 
relative positions of America's social classes undisturbed. 18 
18
christopher Jencks, "LBJ's School Program: A 
Revolution. in American Education?" New Republic, 6 February 
1965, pp. 17-18; "Galbraith and Schlesinger Reply·to Leon 
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From this point of view, welfare programs that 
aim only at alleviating poverty, as if that goal can be 
accomplished without challenging the status of other classes 
in society, are futile. 
The basic idea of the "war on poverty" suggests 
that the enemy is impersonal, a matter of "unfortunate" 
circumstances like "ignorance" or "disease." But, in 
fact, there are people and institutions who have a 
vested interest in the continuation of poverty; employers 
who pay substandard and marginal wages; agricultural 
groups that refuse to pay living wages or to maintain 
decent housing for migrant farm workers; racists who 
understand the connection between maintaining the fic-
tion of white supremacy and the reality of low wages. 
Yet, since such groups exercise a strong political 
influence in the society which is being called upon to 
support the "war," they get unmentioned in the 
propoganda.l9 
For liberals who feel this way to conclude that the welfare 
state is a sham that should be abandoned until we can really 
solve the country's problems would be terribly self-defeating. 
Instead, these liberals want to use the welfare state as the 
initial stage of a social program that will become more 
extensively and explicitly concerned with redistribution of 
income. Only when America has become a more equal society 
can the underlying political and economic causes that create 
the misery of the poor be removed; until those causes are 
removed, the alleviation of poverty will be an endless and 
Keyserling," New Republic, 10 November 1958, p. 15. See also 
James Tobin, "It Can Be Done! Conquering Poverty in the U.S. 
by 1976," New Republic, 3 June 1967, pp. 16-17. 
19Paul Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of 
the Poor," Nation 29 September 1967, p. 197. 
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and fruitless task. 20 
Irving Kristol has been the most persistent critic 
of modern American egalitarianism in recent years. His 
arguments, right or wrong, usually bring out the most 
important questions at the bottom of the redistribution 
controversy. He asserts, for example, that inequality in 
the distribution of income is much less severe than is 
commonly supposed, or rather that the reasons for inequality 
are much less sinister than ofter supposed. The American 
distribution of income is so "center-heavy" that those in 
the 80th or even the 95th percentile live comfortably, but 
not lavishly, he argues. Because it is so lonely at the 
top, efforts to redistribute income from the rich quickly 
wind up imposing heavy taxes on those whom no one would 
consider wealthy. Furthermore, much of the variation in 
income is attributable to causes most people would accept 
as plausible and legitimate. It is hardly unjust, Kristol 
says, for people's earnings to gradually increase through-
out their careers, and then diminish sharply in retirement. 
But the interpretation of income distribution statistics 
often fails to distinguish the poor from those who have 
their careers ahead of them or substantial savings behind 
them. 21 
20 Ibid.; Richard Cloward, "The War on Poverty: 
Are the Poor Left Out?" Nation, 2 August 1965,. p .• 55; 
Irving Louis Horo'.'litz, "The Operatives-Make Their Play," 
Nation, 15 January 1973, p. 74. 
21Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism, pp. 198-201. 
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Kristol offers two reasons why liberal egalitari-
ans are so preoccupied with this limited and understandable 
degree of inequality. According to Kristol, liberals are 
not that interested in equality or in the poor, but find the 
issue of inequality appealing because it provides a basis 
for venting other grievances they have. One such grievance 
is the moral rather than the material shortcomings of a 
bourgeois society. Liberals seek a more ennobling life 
than the one geared to profit, leisure, and security. 
Rather than elaborate a moral critique of modern society, a 
difficult and hazardous task, liberals take up the cause of 
the poor in a critique of the material conditions of 
society that is both easier to make and to understand. The 
severity of this critique is unrelated to the real problems 
of poverty and inequality, says Kristol. Liberals who 
define the problem of inequality in purely relative terms 
guarantee that no redistributive policies could ever issue 
in acceptable social arrangements. "Is such a view pri-
marily interested in the material well-being of poor people 
or the moral well-being of liberal reforwers?'' asks Kristo1. 22 
The plausibility of the latter can be seen clearly in Sweden, 
where rhetoric about inequality has become completely dis-
connected from the realities of inequality. Kristol writes: 
The demand for greater equality has less to do with 
any specific inequities of bourgeois society than with 
the fact that bourgeois society is seen as itself 
22 Ibid., p. 217. 
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inequitable because it is based on a deficient con-
ception of the common good. The recent history of 
Sweden is living proof of this proposition. The more 
egalitarian Sweden becomes--and it is already about as 
egalitarian as it is ever likely to be--the more enrages 
are its intellectuals, the more guilt-ridden and uncer-
tain are its upper-middle classes, the more alienated 
are its college-educated youth. Though Swedish 
politicians and journalists cannot bring themselves 
to believe it, it should be obvious by now that there 
are no reforms that are going to placate the egalitarian 
impulse in Swedish society. Each reform only invigo-
rates the impulse the more, because the impulse is not, 
in the end, about equality at all but about the quality 
of life in bourgeois society.23 
The second of Kristol's explanations for egalitari-
ansism is also unrelated to equality, at least as it pertains 
to rich and poor. Kristol says that, given the social 
status of most liberal egalitarians, whose income and 
importance is often incommensurate, in their own eyes, with 
their education and talents, such people resent the power 
of the corporate sector's managerial class. From the 
intellectual's point of view, these people are narrow and 
unimaginative, working in careers that place a premium on 
such qualities. Whatever else the egalitarian agenda is 
supposed to accomplish, Kristol says, it will surely effect 
the transfer of resources, power, and prestige from the 
private sector to the public sector. It is in the public 
sector that these egalitarians feel they have their only 
real chance to do important things and be important people. 
23Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
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The redistribution of wealth serves as a pretext for the 
redistribution of power. 24 
Liberals and other defenders of the liberal 
agenda have argued that Kristol's argument is ad hominem, 
and that neoconservatives generally have distorted the 
liberal position for polemical advantage. In his book on 
the neoconservatives Peter Steinfels argues that their 
argument turns on the contention that equality of oppor-
tunity is a wholly different concern from equality of 
results. In fact, he argues, the situation is more com-
plicated--the first concern of liberals is alleviating 
poverty, but without placing some limits on the inequality 
in American society, the poor will never have a fighting 
chance. Kristol and the other neoconservatives are far too 
sanguine about the realization of equality of opportunity, 
according to Steinfels. Liberals have a more accurate 
perception of the way in which America continues to resist 
equality of opportunity, and appreciate that inequality may 
only submit to more assertive egalitarian policies. 25 
24 Ibid., pp. 183-184, 224. 
25Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men 
Who Are Changing America's Politics (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1979), pp. 215-216, 231-232; Walzer, "In Defense 
of Equality," pp. 107-123; Herbert J. Gans, More Equality 
(New York: Random House, 1968; Vintage Press, 1974), p. 
24; Wilson, "Liberalism and Purpose," p. 75; Daniel Bell, 
"On Meritocracy and Equality," Public Interest 29 (Fall 
1972): 33-39. 
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So egalitarianism is, from the liberal's perspec-
tive, a necessary component of liberalism if the overriding 
goals of benevolent action are to be achieved. But the 
question of whether egalitarianism has the status of an 
autonomous goal in liberal thought, worthy of pursuit for 
its own sake,remains. Liberals themselves are divided and 
confused by this issue. On the one hand, there is discern-
fort among liberals about being confined to the pursuit of 
benevolence. This feeling was well expressed at the first 
ADA convention: 
[We reject] the view that government's only responsi-
bility is to prevent people from starving or freezing 
to death. We believe it is the function of government 
to lift the level of human existence. It is the job of 
government to widen the chance for development of 
individual personalities. It is not enough for society 
to guarantee the physical survival of its inhabitants; 
it must also2gourish the dignity of and individual human being. 
At the same time, the pragmatist side of the liberal soul 
is uncomfortable with the vague and expansive agenda sug-
gested by such a critique. Liberals who pride themselves on 
realism, who feel that this quality distinguishes them from 
left-wing ideologues, cannot easily embrace a program that 
seeks to "lift the level of human existence". As James 
Nuechterlein points out, liberals are dissatisfied with the 
tepid conclusions to which their analysis often points, but 
26
wyatt address to First National ADA Convention, 
ADA Papers, Series 4, number 9. 
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are unsure how far they want to go beyond minimal welfare 
27 §tate goals. 
Liberals' mixed feelings about prosperity further 
complicate the effort to understand liberals' goals. At 
the end of World War II, liberals insisted that a massive 
depression, worse than the thirties', would be the conse-
quence of peace. This catastrophe could be avoided only be 
a dramatic expansion of the New Deal. Despite the repeated 
failures to enact their desired welfare legislation, however, 
the economy expanded steadily and strongly in the aftermath 
of the war. Liberals were ultimately forced to acknowledge, 
with some sheepishness, that the patient had recovered while 
ignoring the doctor's advice. 28 
When the economy continued to soar in the fifties, 
liberals were forced to abandon their argument that the 
liberal agenda was necessary to avoid economic disaster. 
The argument that replaced it said that prosperity now made 
it possible for society to secure all the things liberals 
wanted it to have. 
27Nuechterlein, "Schlesinger," pp. 39-40; Kaufman, 
ThE: Radical Liberal, pp. 11-12; Paul Seabury, "Gideon's 
Army and Moynihan's Pros," New Republic, 19 March 1966, p. 25. 
28
"The Peril of Victory," New Republic, 20 August 
1945, pp. 203-204; Leo Barnes, "The Anatomy of Full Employ-
ment," Nation, 26 May 1945, pp. 593-597; "The Economic Out-
look," Nation, 19 ,July 1947, pp. 59-60; "Good News is No 
News," New Republic, 4 February 1946, p. 144; Robert 
Lekachman, "Fashions in Liberalism," Nation, 20 September 
1965, pp. 62-66. 
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In an age of affluence we no longer ought to fear 
making value-judgments rather than cost-judgments. If 
ballet is worth having, as we earlier decided public 
libraries were worth having, go ahead and provide tor 
ballet, even though there is not sufficient "demand" 
to make it "economic." This attitude can obviously be 
extended from ballet to beautifying the countryside, and 
in a dozen other different directions. With all this 
wealth we can afford to try.29 
All of liberalism's designs for a better society came to 
rest on the assumption of continued and growing prosperity. 
"Rising prosperity was welfare capitalism's secular equi-
30 
valent of grace." 
But as heavily as they depended on prosperity, 
liberals could not easily bring themselves to accept it. 
Affluence ls an aborted, misdirected abundance; it 
produces waste and trivia, poverty and disaffection; 
it is dedicated to private wealth and public squalor. 
The affluent tend to be mindless, shut off from reality, 
lost in a surfeit of silly possessions and sillier 
pursuits.31 
So while liberalism needed prosperity, it feared it--pros-
perity corrupted popular tastes and made the people unrecep-
tive to liberals' efforts to use our economic strength in 
the service of public goals. As Nuechterlein argues: 
29 Harold Malmgren, "The Economy: A Case for Effi-
cient Planning," New Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 47. 
30 Clecak, Crooked Paths, p. 67. See also address 
by Walter P. Reuther to the ADA convention, ADA papers, 
Series 4, number 88. 
31 
"Forgotten in Abundance?" Nation, 1 February 
1965' p. 97. 
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A prosperous capitalist economy is one that, for 
liberals, is always in danger of losing its political 
and moral soul. If capitalism works too.well, it dulls 
the appetite for liberal reform. It leaves people 
content with diverse, non-public leadership and insuf-
ficiently critical of the moral workings of society. 
From the liberal perspective, an America in (non-
inflationary) economic troubles is more likely to 
recognize its enemies--the capitalist elite~-and less 
inclined to demand the kind of redistributive and regu-
latory governmental activism that liberals identify 
with social health.32 
Arthur Schlesinger attempted to formualte an 
approach that would allow liberalism to accomodate postwar 
propserity, but neigher he nor any other liberal pursued it 
seriously. According to Schlesinger, New Deal liberalism 
was concerned with "quantitative" issues--securing the neces-
sities of life for all Americans. In prosperous times, he 
said, liberalism must become "qualitative," concerned with 
such issues as "education, health, equal opportunity, [andl 
community planning." These will "determine the quality of 
civilization," they will "make the difference between defeat 
and opportunity, between frustration and fulfillment, in 
33 the everyday lives of average persons." How, precisely, 
qualitative liberalism is to differ from what has gone before 
is never made clearer than this. If even health and educa-
tion are on its agenda, then the differences from older 
32Nuechterlein, "The Liberal World," p. 23. 
33
schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, p. 92; The 
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liberalism are subtle indeed. Qualitative liberalism stands, 
not as a clarification of liberalism, but only as further 
evidence of liberalism's intellectual disarray. 
Two things are clear about liberalism's goals. 
First, liberals seek to do good works, to be efficacious 
agents of benevolence in the modern economy. Secondly, 
liberals are not satisfied with just this goal; they seek 
to do and be something more. This something more is quite 
unclear, however. There is no consensus among liberal 
intellectuals about the relationship between egalitarianism 
and liberalism, or on the limits of the welfare state agenda. 
Nor is it readily clear why many liberals feel it is neces-
sary to go beyond altruism, especially when their efforts 
to describe where are so incomplete. One is entitled to 
suspect that benevolence is an unsatisfactory goal because 
it may readily be attained, especially in a prosperous 
economy, and, once attained, will render liberals themselves 
politically irrelevant. A more demanding--and ambiguous--
agenda promises liberals a long future prodding America's 
conscience. It is not unfair to ask whether at least some 
liberals are interested in doing good, as opposed to 
accomplishing good, and would view the actual conquest of 
poverty with mixed feelings. 
CHAPTER THREE 
RENDERING THE WELFARE STATE 
Given the charitable goals of liberalism, how do 
liberals understand the sort of social policies needed to 
realize these goals? The starting point for liberal think-
ing about public policy is that the government has a duty 
to secure every citizen a decent standard of living. "The 
prevention of poverty, disease, and ignorance is as much 
a responsibility of representative government as the pre-
vention of crime."1 The government must seek to assure 
adequate levels of income, without requiring the poor to 
liquidate their assets, and without making compliance with 
demeaning and intrusive regulations the price of 
. t 2 ass1s ance. 
Liberals' writings leave little doubt that welfare 
must ultimately be the responsibility of the government. It 
is impossible to devise private insurance or savings arrange-
ments for something like health care that will be practical 
1 
"State of the Union," New Republic, 10 January 
1949, p. 92. 
2Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "The 
Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty," Nation, 
2 May 1966, p. 511; Robert Theobald, "Abundance: Threat or 
Promise," Nation, 11 May 1963, p. 403. 
83 
84 
for the improverished. Similarly, private charity has a very 
limited capacity to alleviate poverty. Voluntary contri-
butions fail to materialize because individuals suspect· 
that their generosity will not be matched by others, 
rendering their sacrifice, however significant personally, 
trivial compared to the social evils to be alleviated. 
Only a welfare state relying on tax payments assures all 
the citizens of a democracy that their contributions will 
attain the critical mass required for really helping the 
poor. Liberals have also argued that excessive reliance on 
private charity leads to a Balkanized welfare state where 
efforts are hampered for the lack of central coordination 
and clear priorities. 3 
I 
The assumption by the government of the central 
role in securing minimally decent standards of living neces-
sarily leaves government with many politically difficult 
decisions about how to acquire and allocate the welfare 
state's funds. The position of modern liberalism on the 
funding of the welfare state is relatively clear and 
unequivocal. The welfare state is best financed through 
3Michael H. Alderman, "Why Wf..'' Need Medicare," 
New Republic, 26 December 1964, pp. 17-19; Philip Green, 
"Two Cheers for the State," Nation, 26 November 1949, 
pp. 506-607; Leo J. Linder, "Which Bill is Best?" Nation, 
28 May 1960, pp. 467-468. 
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revenues collected from a progressive income tax. "Isn't 
the burden of the country's aged population a burden upon 
all of us? And shouldn't we all carry the burden in pro-
portion to our ability to carry it?"4 The first question 
is already answered by the decision to include support for 
the aged--or the sick, homeless, ill-educated, or jobless--
in the list of welfare state responsibilities. The second 
rhetorical question reflects the liberal belief that the 
more fortunate citizens have a social obligation to help 
the poor. Any scheme other than progressive taxation forces 
the poor to share a large burden of their own assistance, 
5 
a foolish and self-defeating arrangement. 
One does not have to be a Marxist, or attribute 
Marxism to liberals, to suppose that if the guideline for 
funding the welfare state is from each according to his 
abilities, the allocative principle would be to each 
according to his needs. Certainly the general thrust of 
liberal thought, with its stress on the plight and the 
needs of the poor, is compatible with this principle. And 
it is possible to find liberals advocating specific pro-
grams or administrative procedures that go to extraordinary 
lengths to locate and help the needy. Both Nation and New 
4Linder, pp. 467-468. 
5
"Social Security Redux," New Republic, 15 April 
1978, p. 6; Keyserling, "Eggheads and Politics," p. 16. 
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~epublic criticized an Office of Economic Opportunity pro-
gram of low interest loans to needy entrepreneurs. The 
administration of the program was geared to helping business-
men with good credit records and demonstrated management 
ability--who nonetheless were extremely poor and could find 
no other source of financing. Both magazines suggested that 
the government should take more risks in the interests of 
6 
realizing its social welfare goals. 
As a rule, however, liberals have favored dis-
persing the welfare state's benefits to targeting them. 
One reason why liberals prefer to make more people eligible 
for welfare state benefits, rather than concentrating on 
the neediest, is the administrative simplicity of a universal 
or near-universal system. Stringent eligibility criteria 
can only be administred by a powerful and intrusive bureaucracy, 
and may have the perverse effect of forcing people to be, 
or seem, poorer than necessary in order to qualify for 
benefits. Though more inclusive programs have higher costs 




"Small Business Loans," New Republic, 24 September 
1966, p. 9; Mark Levy, "Putting The Poor Out of Business," 
Nation, 12 June 1967, pp. 750-753. See also, "Not Enough," 
Nation, 4 January 1964, pp. 1-2. 
7David Sanford, "Care for the Not-So-Poor," New 
Republic, 4 June 1966. p. a; T.R.B., "The V!ar on Poverty," 
New RE~public, 14 March 1964, p. 2; Richard Lee Strout, "Paying 
for the Right to Life," New Republic, 23 November 1968, pp. 
15-16. 
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A second reason some liberals have given for 
assisting relatively large numbers of people is that it is 
shabby for the government to force people to prove they are 
poor. "The needs test, which amounts to a secular vow of 
poverty, is such a demeaning requirement, psychologically, 
that it could not have been better calculated to dissuade 
8 
the public from availing itself of the help offered." The 
needs test, or means test, reinforces the power of the upper 
classes and the dependency of the poor, an apparent contra-
vention of the purposes of the welfare state. 
[Under the means test,] before aid could be gained, the 
humble recipient must in effect file a pauper's state-
ment, whereupon the kindly upper classes would permit 
the government to bestow largese through tax funds. The 
Social Security Act of 1935 knocked out the philosophy 
of the means test and substituted the idea of social 
insurance, with rich and poor alike paying basic taxes 
and receiving basic protection against a natural human 
hazard.~ 
The most important reason why liberals have favored 
broadly allocative programs is the belief that such programs 
will guarantee broad political support for the welfare state. 
Liberals have acknowledged, obliquely, that helping the poor 
may be politically unpopular. When New Rf~public calls federal 
8 Gerald Krefitz, "Health Care for the Aged (Progress 
Report)," Nation, 4 February 1961, p. 100. 
9
willard Shelton, "Portrait of a Conservative," New 
Republic, 4 April 1949, p. 20. See also, "Consecrated Tory--
Robert A. Taft: The Poor are Always With Us," New Republic, 
5 May 1952. 
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housing programs confined to the poor divisive, it is clear 
that such a program would distinguish a small group of 
beneficiaries from a large group of contributors. The 
resulting political calculus is straightforward. "Presumably 
those policies will win the public heart which are most 
nearly universal in their promise of benefits."10 There is 
no reason to fear antagonizing doctors with a medical 
insurance plan for the elderly; the beneficiaries number in 
the millions and vote faithfully. 11 
A clear example of this liberal belief that 
expanding the list of welfare state beneficiaries would 
deepen political support for the welfare state is the idea, 
advanced by various liberals, that directing funds to the 
working poor will alleviate tension between this group and 
the non-working poor on welfare. It is understandable, their 
argument runs, that people who work in low-paying, disagree-
able jobs should resent that welfare recipients have incomes 
approaching their own. But the working poor are the natural 
allies of the welfare state; their claims for relief are 
nearly as strong as those made by people who can't work at 
all. To end this unnecessary antagonism among America's 
10 Robert Lekachman, "What Works, What Doesn't, 
Nation, 11 May 1974, p. 591. 
11
catherine Bauer, "The A!iddle Class Needs Houses 
Too," pp. 19-20; "Wave of the Future," Nation, 9 April 1960, 
p. 306. 
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least-fortunate citizens, liberals have proposed schemes for 
directing money to the near-poor. A wage supplement plan, 
or special tax and Social Security provisions, or George 
McGovern's demogrant program, would have smoothed over these 
bitter feelings, and oriented the thinking of a large bloc 
of voters towards viewing themselves as beneficiaries of 
redistribution rather than contributors to it. 12 
The Social Security system presents liberals with 
a particularly nasty dilemma. There is no discernible liberal 
support for the Social Security payroll tax. It is regres-
sive, and the liberal approach to funding the welfare state 
is more in harmony with funding Social Security through 
general revenues raised through the progressive income tax. 
But such a shift may have fearful consequences. The Social 
Security system has enjoyed remarkable popular support since 
1935 because, under the payroll tax system, Americans had 
strong and unapologetic claims to their benefits. Social 
Security recipients were not regarded as being on welfare, 
and they did not regard themselves that way. Congress was 
not called upon to assess the claims of the elderly alongside 
those of dozens of other needs in the budgetary process. Any 
shift to general revenue financing could dilute the proprie-
tary claim that recipients now make, and presage the 
12Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "The 
Poor Against Themselves, Nation, 25 November 1968, pp. 558-
562; Dennis Sugga:r.' "Still Forgotten: The v:orking Poor' II 
Nation, 9 June 1969, pp. 724-726; Lekachman, "What Works," 
p. 591. 
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introduction of a needs test into the Social Security system. 
Distasteful as the payroll tax is, liberals are inclined 
to view it as the lesser evil. 13 
In the 1960s liberals, and the nation, rediscovered 
poverty, and emphasized the precarious condition of those 
whom economic growth could not rescue. With attention focused 
on special government programs for what were called the "hard 
core" poor, some liberals began to voice misgivings about the 
undiscriminating largesse of the welfare state. According to 
a Nation article, "Experience shows that the poor have good 
reason to be apprehensive about programs formed in their name 
by the powerful." 14 The government has become very effective 
at providing benefits for organized interest groups, such as 
labor, but does not respond to the unorganized poor. A New 
Republic article charges that whether or not a person is 
eligible for government benefits seems to be randomly deter-
mined. There is no intuitively plausible guideline determining 
whether or how much money is paid out, and as a result the 
poor resent and fear the whole welfare system. 
13
"Revising Social Security," New Republic, 24 
June 1972, p. 9; "State of the Union," New Republic, 10 Janu-
ary 1949, pp. 11-12; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 
pp. 308-309; Merton C. Bernstein, "What Future for Social 
Security?" New Republic, 9 January 1965, pp. 10-11; "Contri-
butory Social Insurance," ADA papers, Series 4, number 25. 
14Frances Fox Pi~en and Richard A. Cloward, "What 
Chance for Black Power?" New Republic, 30 March 1968, p. 21. 
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Social programs that are generally perceived as 
universal in coverage tend to flourish in public favor 
and grow in financial outlay. By grim contrast, efforts 
to help minorities, unless they aid wounded war ve~erans, 
the blind, or the victims of tornados and earthquakes, 
arouse firece opposition; survive, if survive they do, 
in perpetually desparate financial straits, and afford 
standing temptation for exploitation as succulent 
political issues by conservative demagogues.l5 
Liberals have examined federal programs for educa-
tion and found them perversely ineffective for helping the 
poor. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
was supposed to provide money for the "educationally dis-
advantaged." But the actual administration of Title I paid 
little attention to directing aid to the neediest children. 
Title I aid was often given to districts with only a few 
disadvantaged students, and federal officials barely tried 
to make sure that these funds were not diverted by local 
officials to pay for their own educational priorities. Some 
liberals also began to express doubts as to whether govern-
ment funding for higher education did not have the same 
tendency to assist the self-sufficient at the expense of the 
needy. Though the poor were surely taxed to pay for state 
universities and government loan programs, the chances of 
their children going to college and benefitting from them 
were much smaller than middle-class families. 16 
15 Lekachman, "What Works," p. 590; Rep. Martha W. 
Griffiths, "The High Cost of Inequality," Nation, 10 December 
1973, pp. 623-626. 
16
"Poor Children," New Republic, 22 November 1969, 
pp. 9-11; "The Disadvantages of Being Poor," Nation 1 December 
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A similar liberal assessment about programs for 
solving urban problems, especially housing, developed in the 
sixties. Various articles in liberal periodicals raise a 
common complaint. Government programs intended, ostensibly, 
to assist the poor, are inevitably distorted by political 
forces to help the well-to-do, often at the expense of the 
poor. The whole purpose of the Model Cities program was to 
demonstrate the benefits of the intensely concentrated 
expenditure of federal funds, but politics dictated dozens of 
cities receive much smaller grants, with correspondingly 
inconsequential effects. Government loans and loan guaran-
tees had a pivotal role in facilitating "white flight" from 
the cities to the suburbs and the resulting deterioration of 
the urban economic base. When the government steps in to try 
to correct the mess it helped create, its programs, through 
inadvertance or cyncical design, routinely provide more 
tangible benefits to real estate developers and construction 
firms than to Americans in need of decent housing. 17 
One can see evidence of a similar liberal revision-
ism in the assessment of income transfer programs. Why is 
it, one article asks, that unemployment compensation 
1969, p. 590; W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, "The 
Equity Fiction," New Republic, 13 September 1969, pp. 23-24; 
P. Nelson Reid, "Financing Higher Education," New Republic, 
12 June 1971, pp. 13-14. 
17
"Living Room," New Republic, 19 December 1970, 
p. 8; "Suburban Sr.obbery," New Republic, 26 June 1971, p. 8; 
Subsidized Housing," New Republic, 20 Julv 1968 nn 10-11· 
., , ... ... . ' 
"New Housing Start?" New Republic~ 13 March 1965~ p. 8. 
r 
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is politically uncontroversial, while Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children is perpetually under attack, its ben~fi­
ciaries stigmatized in the crudest terms? The former is a 
welfare program for the middle class, states the author, 
while the latter is a welfare program for the poor, and in 
the logic of our welfare state, helping people who need it 
most is always the questionable proposition. This logic, 
which dictates that government assistance to the very poor 
must generally be an incidental byproduct of programs that 
aid a much larger and wealthier group, distorts the function-
ing of the welfare state, causing the government to expend 
vast amounts of economic and political capital to attain 
18 
very modest goals. 
In the wake of the 1980 election, some liberals 
have been trying to reformulate their approach to welfare 
state policy. A few have offered the obvious suggestion 
that liberals unambiguously promote a more discriminating 
welfare state, one that does more for the poor and less, at 
least in terms of providing goods and services, for the non-
poor. These suggestions have been ignored where they have 
not been derided. It will be an extremely delicate task--
it may be an impossible task--for liberals to regenerate 
18Eliot Marshall, "Unemployment Comp is Middle-
Class Welfare," New Republic, 19 February 1977, pp. 16-18; 
Eveline M. Burns, "The Poor Need Money," Nation, 7 June 1965, 
pp. 613-614; Lekacbman, "What Works," p. 590. 
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political support for the welfare state on a basis different 
from economic self-interest. 19 
II 
Getting money to the people who need it is one 
welfare state problem. Seeing that money, once rightly 
directed, actually conduces to the attainment of the welfare 
state goals, is another. Kindness has become a more ambitious 
and complex virtue in our age than it once was. 
At the time when Saint Francis impulsively gave his 
fine clothes to a beggar, nobody seems to have been very 
interested in what happened to the beggar. Was he 
rehabilitated? Did he open a small business? Or was 
he found the next day, naked again, in an Assisi gutter, 
having traded the clothes for a flagon of Orvieto? 
These were not the sort of questions that engaged the 
medieval mind. The twentieth century has developed a 
morE, ambitious definition of what it means to help 
somebody.20 
The New Deal had approached poverty as a transi-
tional problem. Men and women prepared to contribute to 
American society needed only the guarantee of a decent living 
to be self-sufficient. Efforts to apply this approach in 
the postwar boom left liberals feeling that they were 
"running out of poor people." "Unlike the ambitious 
19
"Liberals and Inflation," New Republic, 20 
January 1979, pp. 5-6, 8-13; Gelman, "Liberal Agenda," p. 82. 
20Quoted in George F. Will, The Pursuit of Happi-
Ness: And Other Sobering Thoughts (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1978), p. 196. 
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immigrants of the eighteen-nineties or the politically un-
employed of the nineteen-thirties, the poor of the fifties 
were all too often a demoralized and inarticulate minority 
who in many cases had inherited their poverty and passively 
accepted it as a permanent condition."21 Assisting this 
kind of poor person was a challenge for which liberals were 
not intellectually prepared, and for which the government 
22 
was not functionally prepared. 
This is no liberal consensus as to the potential 
for self-sufficiency among today's poor. One article can 
assert that, "If jobs were available, ••• most of those now on 
welfare, .•• would be self-supporting." 23 Another article, 
published the same year says that 99 per cent of those on 
welfare are ''new born infants, deserted mothers, and disease-
24 
ridden old people beyond the possibility of employment." 
It sometimes seems that the liberal view of the poor changes 
for polemical reasons. There is a tendency to emphasize 
21
schlesinger, The Politics of Hope, pp. 245-246. 
22
naniel A. Satter, "West Side Story: Home is 
Where the Welfare Check Comes," New Republic, 2 July 1966, pp. 
15-19; Wildavsky, "Government and the People," pp. 26. 
23Melville J. Ulmer, "Waiting for Welfare," New 
Republic, 13 November 1971, pp. 10-11. 
24
sen. Ernest F. Hollings, "The Reality of American 
Hunger," Nation, 26 April 1971, p. 520. See also Burns, "The 
Poor Need Money," p. 613; Jencks, "Slums and Schools--!," 
p. 21. 
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the poor's incapacities when defending transfer payments and 
their potential when job training and education programs are 
under attack. 25 
For the most part, however, liberal confusion about 
the poor seems genuine rather than calculated. The relatively 
simple approach of the New Deal is no longer adequate. 
Liberals are unsure what to do for the modern poor, because 
they are unsure whether these poor, America's "underclass," 
are impoverished because they lead disordered lives or lead 
disordered lives because they are impoverished. To the 
extent liberals have tried to take the most optimistic view 
of the poor, they often found themselves trying hardest to 
help those least likely to benefit from their efforts. As 
described by Aaron Wildavsky, this inclination has worked 
to make a successful poverty program an impossibility: Any 
program that actually helps some people compete in the labor 
market or to become community leaders comes under suspicion 
for having selected clients who were not the neediest 
available. 26 
A particularly difficult problem for liberals is 
the possibility that some beneficiaries of the welfare state 
Will become dependent on it, that welfare will not have the 
effect of re-empowering self-sufficient people to care 
25Harry Lipman, "'Workfare' and Welfare,".Nation, 
20 August 1977, pp. 142-143; Jencks, "Johnson v. Poverty," 
P. 17; Melville J. Ulmer, "Work and Welfare," New Republic, 
3 July 1971, pp. 12-14. 
26Wildavsky, p. 27. 
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for themselves, but of transforming capable adults into 
unmotivated recipients. Though conservatives have done most 
of the complaining about welfare recipients' sense of s·elf-
reliance, liberals have acknowledged that there is a real 
danger. Schlesinger said that New Dealers were concerned 
that their programs were making some Americans less capable 
of providing for themselves, and Richard Cloward, writing 
in Nation, says that the modern welfare system promotes the 
disintegration of families by "substituting check-writing 
27 
machines for male wage earners." 
One troubling manifestation of the dependency 
problem is the implicit tax on the earnings of welfare 
recipients--the portion of the dollar they earn that is off-
set by a loss of welfare benefits. These "taxes" can be 
quite high in individual programs, and a family receiving 
several kinds of aid can face a cumulative implicit tax of 
well over 100%, a powerful disincentive to getting off welfare. 
There is a simple solution to the implicit tax--create 
lenient rules about how much people can earn before they begin 
to surrender their welfare benefits. This solution has an 
obvious political problem, however. The consequence of lower-
ing the implicit tax is including millions of new recipients 
in the welfare system. The regulations that allow the welfare 
27
schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, p. 275; 
Cloward, "The War on Poverty," p. 55. 
98 
family to earn income without losing benefits also make the 
family that had been getting by on its earnings alone eligible 
for welfare for the first time. The decision to explicitly 
accept this expansion of the welfare system as a consequence 
of making the welfare system rational was the core of George 
McGovern's 1972 "demogrant" proposal, first outlined by Yale 
economist James Tobin in New Republic. That this idea did 
so much to label McGovern an extremist, contributing to his 
defeat, has caused many liberals to lose interest in the 
"dependency trap" created by the implicit tax. 28 
In Wealth and Poverty, George Gilder has taken the 
problem of dependency very seriously. He argues that while 
economic growth under capitalism has always required risk-
taking and exertion, the network of welfare programs dis-
courages economic growth and participation in the economy by 
the marginally poor. 
The moral hazards of current programs are clear. 
Unemployment compensation promotes unemployment. Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) makes more 
families dependent and fatherless. Disability insurance 
in all its multiple forms encourages the promotion of 
small ills into temporary disabilities and partial dis-
abilities into total and permanent ones. Social security 
payments may discourage concern for the aged and dissolve 
the links between generations. Programs of insurance 
28 Robert J. Lampman, "What Does It Do For the Poor?--
A New Test for National Policy," in The Great Society, ed. 
Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 77-78; James Tobin, "It Can Be Done," 
pp. 17-18; Robert J. Lampman, "What We Know About Poverty," 
Nation, 9 December 1968, pp. 625-626; Griffiths, "Inequality," 
p. 626. 
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against low farm prices and high energy costs create a 
glut of agricultural commodities and a dearth of fuels. 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) sub-
sidies for government make-work enhance a feeling of 
dependence on the state without giving the sometimes 
bracing experience of genuine work. All means-tested 
programs (designed exclusively for the poor) promote the 
value of being "poor" (th~ credential of poverty) and 
thus perpetuate poverty.2 
Poverty is an evil, says Gilder, but the very fact 
that it is so unpalatable points the way out of poverty. 
The most serious fraud is committed not by members 
of the welfare culture, but by the creators of it, who 
conceal for the poor, both adults and children, the most 
fundamental realities of their lives: that to live well 
and escape poverty they will have to keep their families 
together at all costs and work harder than the classes 
above them. In order to succeed, the poor need most of 
all the spur of their poverty.30 
Assuming continued immigration, "there will be poverty in 
America for generations to come," says Gilder. All previous 
generations of immigrants were initially poor, but rose 
through hard work, the strength of the nuclear family, and 
faith in themselves and the future. A welfare system that 
penalizes work, promotes the dissolution of families, and 
encourages the poor to think of themselves as victims, to 
concentrate on their liabilities rather than their strenghts, 
destroys all of the forces which have led millions of Ameri-
. 31 
cans out of poverty, Gilder argues. 
29George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: 
Basic Books, 1981), p. 111; pp. 109-113. 
30 Ibid., ~. 118. 
31 Ibid., pp. 64-74. 
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With the best of intentions, we have created a 
welfare system that perpetuates mise~y rather than helps end 
it. According to Gilder: 
Welfare, by far the largest economic influence in the 
ghetto, exerts a constant, seductive, erosive pressure 
on the marriages and work habits of the poor, and over 
the years, in poor communities, it fosters a durable 
"welfare culture" ••.• The fundamental fact in the lives 
of the poor in most parts of America today is that the 
wages of common labor are far below the benefits of 
AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, public housing, public 
defenders, leisure time, and all the other goods and 
services of the welfare state. As long as this situa-
tion persists, real family poverty will tend to get 32 
worse, particularly in areas congested with the poor. · 
Gilder 1 s conclusions about welfare reform are stark, and 
certainly unpalatable to liberals. Strict enforcement of 
welfare eligibility is helpful, but does not really solve the 
welfare problem. Gilder writes: 
There is no such thing as a good system of artificial 
income maintenance. The crucial goal should be to 
restrict the system as much as possiblA~ by making it 
unattractive and even a bit demeaning.3~ 
Liberals who have written on this subject have, for 
the most part, dismissed fears such as Gilder 1 s as unrealis-
tic. They draw on a variety of sources in an effort to show 
that government support does not render individuals incapable 
of supporting themselves. One article cites the experience 
32
rbid., p. 122. 
33
rbid., p. 117. 
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of Western European nations, where relatively generous 
assistance sy~ems co-exist with very low unemployment rates. 
Another points to one state's experimental program where 
welfare case-workers were given unusually light case loads; 
the extra attention given to clients resulted in so many 
of them leaving the welfare rolls that the program paid for 
itself. Schlesinger even quotes Winston Churchill's doubts 
that welfare "will sap the vitality and self-reliance of 
our race. There will be quite enough grirdstone in human 
34 life to keep us keen." 
The argument that welfare does not always and 
certainly lead to dependence is well taken. Even Gilder 
acknowledges that most people who need welfare need it for 
only a short time, and resume supporting themselves as 
quickly as possible. But there is a more basic theoretical 
difficulty with the liberal approach to the question. I 
found no evidence of any consideration by liberals of an 
important phenomenon, the case of one immigrant group after 
another in America from poverty to the middle class in the 
absence of the welfare state. Such a fact is not a pleasant 
one for liberals to consider, suggesting that welfare may 
not be necessary or even wise in some circumstances. The 
34Margaret S. Gordon, "Failure of Unemployment 
Insurance," Nation, 7 June 1965, p. 612; "Goldwater's Law," 
New Republic, 1 February 1964, pp. 4-5; Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 1: The Crisis of the Old 
Order: 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 179. 
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neglect of this fact argues that liberals do not have a 
theory about economic growth; they are interested in redis-
tribution, directly or indirectly, but have taken the 
35 
economic growth that lubricates redistribution for granted. 
To the extent that liberals have considered economic 
growth, their thought has concentrated on the political 
stimulation of the demand for economic growth. This demand 
is, of course, the focus of Keynsian economics, or at least 
those portions of Keynsianism assimilated by liberals. 
Liberals have also endorsed the most political aspects of 
the War on Poverty, such as community action programs, with 
the argument that political action is the best way for the 
t . d t . 36 poor o rece1ve an a equa e 1ncome. The picture that 
emerges is of a faceless economic system, a "black box," 
that will generate more goods in response to political 
pressure. But goods and services are not produced by an 
economic system, but through the ingenuity and industry of 
men and women. Liberals' lack of interest in the relation-
ship between social policy and productivity is a serious 
dereliction of intellectual duty. 
35Gilder, pp. 52, 125-126. 
36Roger H. Davidson, "The Politics of Anti-Poverty," 
Nation, 24 February 1969, pp. 233-237; Cloward and Piven, 
"The Weight of the Poor," pp. 510-517; Richard A. Cloward 
and Frances Fox Piven, "Birth of a Movement," Nation, 8 May 
1967, pp. 584-585. 
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III 
What we have learned from the experience of the 
postwar welfare state, an experience that included a great 
deal of controversy about the government's role in alleviating 
distress, and a significant expansion of that role in the 
1960's? Before examining liberals' assessments of the actual 
practice of the welfare state we should outline the critique 
of recent welfare state policies. One of the propositions 
in the case against the modern welfare state is that it has 
led to explosive growth of the public sector, and that 
government activity at this level cannot be sustained, 
economically or politically. Roger Freeman calculated that 
if the government budget grew at the same rate between 1972 
and 2000 as it did between 1952 and 1972, 36% of the work 
force would be in the public sector, and government would 
spend 70% of the Gross National Product, compared to 36% in 
1972. 37 
A second assertion is that welfare state efforts 
were, by and large, a disappointment, that America did not 
get its money's worth. Lance Liebman has summarized the 
variations on this theme. One view is that people had rising 
expectations, which ran far ahead of the actual progress of 
37 Clecak, Crooked Paths, p. 73. See also Levitan 
and Taggert, The Promise of Greatness, pp. 20-34. 
r 
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government programs. A second contention is that the govern-
ment took on some tasks, such as training for the least 
employable, which no one really knew how to do, and for which 
there may in fact be no successful approach. Money spent 
in these areas inevitably leads to disappointments. A third 
argument is that the public sector is inherently costly and 
inefficient, and delegating additional responsibilities to 
it only worsens the problem. Finally, the welfare agenda 
required a threshold investment of resources, financial and 
political, which the American majority was unwilling to 
38 
surrender. 
The combination of escalating costs and escalating 
disappointments had led some to conclude that frustration 
inheres in the welfare state. Milton Friedman contends 
simply that the essence of the welfare state is X, a govern-
ment official, spending money collected from Y, a taxpayer, 
for the benefit of Z, a recipient. Because X is neither 
spending his own money nor spending money on himself he has 
no incentive to economize or to get full value for his costs: 
Public housing is both expensive and shoddy. Arthur Okun's 
gentler analysis of the welfare state is only slightly more 
comforting to liberals. He says that costs and inefficiencies 
are inevitable in welfare programs, and that the test of a 
38Lance Liebman, "Social Intervention in a Democracy," 
in Ginzberg and S0low, p. 17. See also Wildavsky, p. 26. 
105 
person's commitment to the welfare state is the ratio of 
costs to benefits he is willing to tolerate. Plausible 
though this characterization may be, the coupling of 
liberalism with a tolerance for government costs is less 
than a public relations coup. 39 
Liberal intellectuals have, with few exceptions, 
not even tried to construct a blanket defense of the modern 
American welfare state. One finds instead a number of cri-
tical judgments on various aspects of the welfare state. A 
New Republic article criticizes the VISTA program as a nice 
idea ("a domestic Peace Corps") that no one in Washington 
bothered to think through. As a consequence, there was often 
very little for the volunteers to do. The rush to enact 
legislation in the mid-sixties often precluded policy-making 
sobriety. 40 The selection of policy goals was often made for 
inexplicable or less than admirable reasons, liberals have 
alleged in Nation and New Republic. Limited resources were 




39Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 116-117; Arthur 
Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington, 
The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 88-100. 
40Andrew Kopkind, "VISTA on a Cloudy Day," New 
Republic, 19 March 1966, pp. 17-18; Michael Harrington:-
Towards a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a New 
Majority (New York: Macmillan, 1968; Pelican, 1969), pp. 
11-12; James I.. Sundquist, "Origins of the War on Poverty," 
in On Fighting Poverty, ed. Sundquist, pp. 28-29. 
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41 in response to political pressure or bureaucratic needs. 
The literature also shows that liberals have been 
concerned and indignant about the administrative costs of 
the welfare state. A sardonic New Republic editorial says 
that "poverty has been a growth industry"--for social workers 
and social scientists, who prospered during the War on 
Poverty. But there is no discernible improvement in the 
lives of the poor as a result of this enrichment of the 
poverty industry. Simplify the programs, dispense with the 
arcane studies and pilot projects, the editorial suggests, 
and both the poor and the taxpayers will be better off. 42 
The flaws of bad planning, bad administration, and 
needless expenses in the welfare state that liberals have 
acknowledged are not inherent in the welfare state; it is 
at least possible to imagine more efficient government 
assistance to the poor. Critics of the welfare state have 
argued, however, that it suffers from a deeper political 
problem that no administrative reforms can solve. Once it 
begins to attend to the problems of poverty, government in 
a modern democracy becomes subject to demands that distort 
41 Ivor Kraft, "Head Start to What?" Nation, 
5 September 1966, pp. 179-182; "Domestic Pacification," 
New Republic, 1 July 1967, p. 7; "Little by Little, Less and 
Less of OEO," New Republic, 10 December 1966, pp. 10-11. 
42
"Growth Industry," New Republic, 7 August 1971, 
p. 9. See also, James Ridgeway, "Simulating Poverty: Input 
and Output," New Republic, 11 June 1966, pp. 9-10; James 
Rideway, "Rebuilding the Slums," New Republic, 7 January 1967, 
p. 25. 
107 
policies and politics. 
As it turns into a rational instrument of public policy, 
the state opens itself to endless claims, beginning 
with modest demands of economic, racial and ethnic 
groups for minimal inclusion and extending to more ela-
borate claims for a series of broad economic, political 
and social rights for everyone. These tendencies 
encourage grandiose rhetoric and heightened expecta-
tions on the one sine, disappointment and disillusion-
ment on the other.43 
Good intentions cannot long withstand powerful political 
forces, and the welfare state is reordered to accomodate 
political priorities that have nothing to do with alleviating 
poverty. David Stockman cites "impact aid" as a case in 
point. The federal government began the program by assist-
ing 2% of the nation's school districts, those facing 
additional expenses because of military bases and defense 
plants in the Korean War. By the 1970s, impact aid was 
being given to 25% of all school districts enrolling half 
of the nation's children. The great majority of these 
districts are quite self-sufficient, but there are strong 
political pressures to expand the program and none at all 
for it to contract. 44 Milton Friedman paraphrases Adam Smith 
to characterize the welfare state: "An individual who 
intends only to serve the public interest by fostering govern-
ment intervention is 'led by an invisible hand to promote' 
43 Clecak, p. 74. 
44 Stockman, "Social Pork Barrel," p. 15. 
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private interests 'which was no part of his intention'" 45 
Liberals' reflections on the welfare state have 
come to similar, but less sweeping and less harsh conclu-
sions. Liberal critiques of the welfare state focus on the 
way in which the programs originally intended for the poor 
have been captured by the affluent and powerful. Real 
estate interests have undermined public housing programs. 
New Deal programs to secure home mortgages have continued 
and grown, and now benefit the middle class exclusively. 
Income transfer programs are starved for funds to help the 
poor because of the demands of the self-sufficient. And 
government programs designed to increase the political 
leverage of the poor come with so many conditions attached 
46 that the poor are left even more dependent and powerless. 
Another problem liberals have noted is that 
innovation in welfare policies is stifled by the claims of 
constituencies profiting from the status quo. According to 
a New Republic article: 
For all intents and purposes welfare reform has been 
dead for years now. The existing welfare system pro-
vides so many benefits to such a broad range of interest 
groups--farmers, the construction industry, lawyers, 
45F . dm r1e an, Free to Choose, pp. 5-6. 
46Harry Conn, "Housing: A Vanishing Vision," 
New Republic, 30 July 1951, pp. 12-13; Alfred Steinberg, 
"FHA--Profits Before Housing," Nation, 1 January 1949, pp. 
11-13; Burns, "The Poor Need Money," p. 614; Piven and 
Cloward, "What Chance for Black Power?" p. 21. 
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doctors, and most important of all, bureaucrats--that 
it probably can never be dismantled. No Congress will 
radically alter the welfare system until it is in the 
interest of some equally powerful interest group to do 
so. Right now the only people who would benefit from 
a negative income tax are the poor.47 
Efforts to prune old programs that benefit the non-poor and 
those to create new ones to help the poor are beset by the 
same problem: the end of the postwar economic boom has 
meant that such innovations will have discernible costs, 
and American government allocates these less adroitly than 
it allocates benefits. 48 
While acknowledging the problem of rising entitle-
ments, liberals have maintained that the welfare state is 
only one factor contributing to it. The preoccupation of 
American culture with material success, and the ubiquitous 
display of that vision through television, have certainly 
escalated the demands made on our political economy. An 
internal dynamic of the American polity has always been 
groups--factions--pressuring the government for certain 
economic concessions. To regard the recent wave of demands 
on the public fisc as a shocking departure from past habits is 
1 . t 49 a arm1s • 
47
"Liberals and Inflation," New Republic, 20 January 
1979, p. 10. 
48
see, "In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic, 
p. 5; Kotz, "Politics of Welfare Reform," p. 20. 
49
"The Federal Government and Social Rights," Intel-
lect, March 1977, p. 294; "The Real Problem," Nation, 10 
August 1964, p. 42; Herbert J. Gans, "The Demands of 
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One of the main purposes of the extended commercial 
republic was to diffuse class conflict, to encourage people 
to think of themselves as members of smaller and more nUmerous 
groups than the rich or the poor. Critics of the American 
welfare state assert, however, that it has increased friction 
among large groups as well as small. Those on the left, 
in particular, view the efforts of the sixties as attempts 
to foist middle-class values on the poor. A variety of pro-
grams were implemented with the goal of changing the attitudes 
and habits of the poor in ways more agreeable to the American 
majority. That the poor resented these efforts, and that 
the middle class felt its good intentions were being snubbed, 
50 
were predictable consequences. 
More conservative observers emphasize the way in 
which the welfare state had deepened antagonisms between the 
poor and those earning slightly more than the poverty level. 
From the vantage point of low and middle income working 
people, the welfare state is grossly unfair. Those who 
perform the least interesting and lowest paying jobs are 
asked to contribute most heavily to those who do not 
work at all.51 
Consciousness II," Nation, 1 March 1971, p. 276. See also 
Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New 
York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 233. 
50Elinor Graham, "The Politics of Poverty," in 
Gettleman and Mermelstein, pp. 217-224; Tom Hayden, "Welfare 
Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman and Mermelstein, 
pp. 478-481; Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," in 
On Fighting Poverty, ed. Sundquist, pp. 34-35, 38-40. 
51 Clecak, p. 90. 
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The near-poor are particularly aggravated by the sense that 
government devotes special attention to the very poor, whose 
improvement is especially unlikely, rather than themselves, 
who could more plausibly gain from training or education 
52 programs. 
The divisiveness of community action programs, which 
encouraged the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor 
in designing and implementing poverty programs, has received 
special attention from the welfare state's critics. The 
whole idea was included suddenly and with little reflection 
in the Economic Opportunity Act. To the extent that govern-
ment officials thought about it at all, they hoped that com-
munity action would lead the poor to behave "like PTA delegates, 
enlisted into the democratic process without really disturb-
ing anybody." 53 When some community action programs became 
aggressively political, the Office of Economic Opportunity's 
dilemma became acute. To stifle the programs would be to 
tell the poor that their political participation was welcome, 
as long as its form and substance were approved by main-
stream America. To support all the manifestations of community 
action would certainly infuriate the taxpayers who were fund-
ing it. 54 
52
wildavsky, pp. 27-28; Clecak, pp. 80-81. 
53William C. Selover, "View From Capital Hill: Har-
rassment and Survival," in Sundquist, p. 167. 
54 Ibid., p. 183; Martin, Civil Rights, p. 201. 
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Yet liberal opinion has generally been in favor of 
community action. An editorial in Nation emphasized the 
importance of community action as a "feedback channel" for 
policy-makers. No one can bring the poor's perspective to 
the evaluation of poverty programs, and no evaluation that 
excludes their perspective can be adequate. "There is nothing 
novel about the notion th~.t the benefiticaries of a federal 
program should be consulted about it. If the poor were 
called 'farmers' or 'miners' or 'shippers' no questions would 
be raised." 55 A New Republic editorial stressed the impor-
tance of community action programs in the political revitali-
zation of the ghetto. 
The hope for the poverty program was not that it 
would wipe out poverty over night but that it would begin 
to revive the instruments of representative government 
which lie in wreck and ruin in the slums ••• 
What matters most in Watts, on Chicago's west side, 
in Harlem, is that the federal poverty program reach 
down and begin the tedious job of constructing demo-
cratic institutions in the slum blocks so that the~e 
stagnant wastelands can have a voice in governing.5 
Community action is a necessary check, in this view, against 
a paternalistic or exploitive poverty program. 57 
55
"A Voice for the Poor," Nation, 14 June 1965, 
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Liberal assessments of community action after it 
had been in existence for a few years were more qualified. 
Liberals felt that they as well as the designers and admini-
strators of the poverty program, had held unreasonable ex-
pectations about the transfer of political power. Savvy 
politicians did not retire from the field at the sight of a 
few federally funded community action programs. Powerful 
local officials did not attain that status without being 
resourceful, especially in terms of letting Congress know 
their opinions. The entire community action program quickly 
faced strong legislative pressure; the upshot was that 
community action funds were eventually controlled by the 
very officials the program was supposed to challenge. 
"Community action appealed to the policy makers in part 
because it seemed to promise maximum results from a minimum 
investment of funds." 58 Experience quickly revealed that 
59 
such a program was too good to be true. 
When community action programs were involved in 
political conflicts in which the fault lines were essentially 
racial, the limitations of community action programs were 
58Francis Pierce, "Welfare on the Cheap," review of 
Maximum FE:asible Misunderstanding, by Daniel P. Moynihan, in 
New Republic, 22 February 1969, p. 23. 
59Davidson, "The Politics of Anti-Poverty," p. 237; 
Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, "The First Congress 
of the Poor," Nation, 7 February 1966, p. 149; Andrew Kopking, 
"Poor Politics," New F.epublic, 25 June 1966, pp. 15-17. 
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particularly obvious. 
The war on poverty has been predicated on the notion that 
there is such a thing as a community, which can be defined 
geographically and mobilized for a collective effort to 
help the poor. This theory has no relationship to reality 
in the Deep South.60 
Their perception of the intractibility of the racial antagonism 
caused some liberals to lose their confidence in the applica-
tion of federal funds to the problems of poverty. Gradual 
reforms may have been incapable of delivering meaningful 
61 
changes. 
A final charge made against the welfare state is 
that it necessarily occasions a conflict between the raising 
and meeting of public expectations. The long-time political 
health of a welfare state program requires that political 
leaders foster modest expectations about it. They must 
encourage people to be patient, given the difficulties of 
designing and implementing programs. It would even be 
desirable if a program could remain inconspicuous until it 
was clearly successful. But the experience of the sixties 
shows that politics is often the enemy of cautious policy 
making. Opportunities for inaugurating ambitious new pro-
jects, such as that given to Lyndon Johnson in 1965, are 
60
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infrequent and short-lived. To move cautiously during these 
rare moments may be the practical equivalent of not moving 
at all. Many factors besides Johnson's grandiosity led to 
. h f h G S · ·t 62 the expans1ve opes o t e reat oc1e y. 
In retrospect, the duty of liberal intellectuals 
during this period was to temper expectations, to counteract 
the politicians' necessarily inflated rhetoric. As a rule, 
however, liberals were as incautious as everyone else. The 
pages of Nation and New Republic show that liberals clearly 
understood that the Great Society's rhetorical commitments 
were going to require much deeper financial commitments 
than those made in the mid-sixties. Instead of worrying about 
the long-term dangers of these political debts, liberals were 
inclined to praise the cleverness that wrested expansive 
programs from an unwitting and unwilling public. Perhaps they 
believed that the programs would have become undeniable sue-
cesses before the taxpayers' patience was exhausted. But 
liberals really should not be held blameless for or surprised 
by the eventual backlash against the welfare state. 63 
62Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons of the 1960's," 
in Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 212-216; Martin, Civil Rights, p. 
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Liberals are uncertain about what goals they want 
the welfare state to realize. The minimum agenda of securing 
decent living standards is unsatisfying, but the more ambi-
tious goals are dangerous and confusing. This confusion about 
goals reaches into the liberal discussion of the means for 
relaizing the welfare state. Liberals have not been clear 
about how the government should help the poor. They are not 
sure what to think of the groups that will pay for the welfare 
state, so they advocate policies that blur the distinction 
between contributors and recipients. Liberals are also 
unsure what to think of the poor; their policy advice ranges 
from optimistic self-help programs to patient and resigned 
income maintenance. 
Running through this unfocused approach to policy-
making is a tremendous reluctance to challenge or discomfit 
the American public. The welfare state cannot be both inex-
pensive and generous, stern and indulgent. But liberals have 
been reluctant to utter this truth, or the corollary that 
real welfare programs are apt to be difficult compromises 
that will evince limited measures of all these desired 
qualities. One can understand and even forgive, up to a point, 
the disingenuousness of politicians who fail to make these 
difficult truths plain. All the good that a politician would 
do presupposes his exercise of the power to do it; statesman-
ship may impose justifiable restraints on candor. But the 
117 
democratic pressures on intellectuals are less severe. 
Editors and writers do not stand for election, and as a 
result enjoy greater leeway to speak of disagreeable but 
unavoidable realities. Because liberal intellectuals have 
so consistently made the least of these possibilities, one 
must ascribe their failures not to individual shortcomings, 
but to liberalsim itself. Liberal optimism makes it diffi-
cult to see unpleasant facts, and liberal democratism makes 
it difficult to say them. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LIBERALISM ON THE AMERICAN SPECTRUM 
I 
The success of Arthur Schlesinger's 1949 book, The 
Vital Center, can be seen in the way in which its title 
entered the language as an indication of a certain type of 
liberalism. Vital center liberalism was liberalism purged 
of all sentimentality regarding the radical left, liberalism 
that steadfastly defended experimentation and discussion 
against socialist and capitalist dogma. Schlesinger's his-
tories of the Roosevelt and Jackson administrations were 
arguments that non-ideological liberalism was the authenti-
cally American approach to politics. 
In setting themselves apart from the American left, 
liberals like Schlesinger treated Communism as the chief 
issue. The motivating force behind the founding of Americans 
for Democratic Action was to rescue the reputation of liberal-
ism from the Progressive Party of Henry Wallace, where the 
World War II cooperation between Russia and America was 
regarded as based on compatible or reconcilable principles 
rather than geo-political necessity. While Wallace and his 
followers blamed U.S. intransigence: for the Cold War, vital 
118 
119 
center liberals interpreted the East-West clashes as proof of 
incanpatibility of liberalisn and a sympathy for Communism. Accord-
ing to a New Republic editorial after the invasion of Hungary: 
Ever since the Russian revolution, many sincere liberals 
from John Reed to Jean-Paul Sartre, though they might have 
admitted that Communism was often brutal and cynical, 
usually in the end came back to the same point: its 
stand against exploitation was nearer to the Sermon on the 
Mount than was Capitalism. Whenever presented with a 
choice between the two, many men of good will were in-
clined to give Communism the benefit of the doubt, •••• 
Despite the horror of the labor camps, and the slaughter 
trials, the great myth of the 20th century remained 
intact •••• 
It is this myth that the ¥ussian tanks crushed as 
they lurched through Budapest. 
Schlesinger denied that any American foreign policy, except for 
complete capitulation, would have avoided the Cold War. In 
the first place, the Kremlin regarded the very existence of a 
capitalist democracy as an intolerable threat. Secondly, "The 
personal word of the Communist is worthless and cooperation 
with him impossible. The phenomenon is worldwide." Finally, 
pragmatic Americans could never find a way to deal with an 
empire completely in the grip of ideology. 2 
Schlesinger disagrees with those on the left who 
acknowledge the evils of Stalin's reign, but say that these 
are accidentally not essentially related to Communism. Such 
people are disposed to believe anything good about Communism, 
1
"Myth with Nine Lives," New Republic, 26 November 
1956' p. 3. 
2schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 99-100; 136; 
Schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, pp. 135-136. 
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he says. Even the pact between Russian and Nazi Germany was 
forgiven. People who apologize for the Soviet Union do not 
realize that it is inherently totalitarian, given the un-
limited sway accorded the Communist Party by Lenin. As a 
totalitarian state, the U.S.S.R. practices a form of tyranny 
more complete and horrible than even the most brutal dictator-
3 
ships of the past. 
Because of its stern rejection of Communism, vital 
center liberalism was able to criticize American leftists 
sympathetic to Russia. Schlesinger's description of real 
liberalism makes this clear: 
It is mistrustful of utopianism, perfectionism, and 
maximalism. It abhors the maudlin sloganism of the popu-
lar front of the '30's. It refuses to believe that lofty 
aspirations excuses cruel oppression. In particular, it 
lacks the patience for those who can pronounce societies 
"progressive" which develop huge and terrible systems of 
forced labor and deny freedom of expression and movement 
to the bulk of their populations.4 
The failure of the American left to acknowledge the crimes of 
Communism is attacked again and again. This failure has 
placed the left in a state of "moral paralysis," it has aided 
the cause of reactionaries, and it has made the left seem in-
different to the reconciliation of liberty and democratic 
3
schlesinger, Vital Center, pp. 149; 70; 53-54. 
4
schlesinger, Politics of Hope, p. 70. 
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organization of the economy. 
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Schlesinger was a forceful critic of Sen. Joseph 
McCarthy, but it is worth remembering that Schlesinger's anti-
Communism was robust enough to take the possibility of internal 
subversion seriously. 
There can be no serious question that an underground 
Communist apparatus attempted during the late thirties 
and during the war to penetrate the United States government, 
to influence the formation of poli~y and even to collect 
intelligence for the Soviet Union. 
Schlesinger even takes the discussion of anti-Communist exces-
ses as an opportunity to remind liberals of the importance of 
sober anti-Communism. "When liberals denounce the Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee for failing to distinguish between 
liberals and Communists, they should remember how long it 
took them before they started making that distinction them-
7 
selves." Given the nature of the Soviet threat, Schlesinger 
concludes, "There is surely no alternative to paying exact 
and unfaltering attention to the Communists in our midst." 8 
5
schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 130-131; Lewis S. 
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This straight-forward liberal anti-Communism made 
it possible for liberals to endorse and defend the U.S. policy 
in Vietnam in the early sixties. Hubert Humphrey, for 
example, was capable of describing South Vietnam as if it 
were the newest TVA project. Arthur Schlesinger came to 
criticize the factual assumptions of the Johnson administra-
tion about Vietnam's importance to American interests, but he 
acknowledged that the motive that led Johnson into Vietnam--
a desire for America to defend democracy throughout the world--
was honorable. 9 
Schlesinger tried to find a vital center approach to 
Vietnam in his 1966 book, The Bitter Heritage. He advocated 
a "middle course" for getting out of Vietnam: de-escalation, 
diminished use of bombing, consideration of a cease-fire 
after progress had been made in negotiations. But as liberal 
revulsion over Vietnam grew, the possibility of a centrist 
position disappeared. Schlesinger himself grew steadily 
more critical of America's presence in Vietnam. Two years 
after arguing that the U.S. could not withdraw from Vietnam, 
Schlesinger said, "Our country has never undertaken anything 
more absurd in its history than the Vietnam war." 10 His con-
trition became complete in 1978 when, in his biography of 
9
sch1esinger, Crisis of Confidence, pp. 156; 145-146; 
152; 156-157. 
10Ibid., p. 40. 
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Robert Kennedy, Schlesinger said that the New Left had been 
correct in calling for unilateral withdrawal in 1967. The 
certain fall of South Vietnam was less horrible than the 
continuing division of American society over the war. 11 
As his doubts about Vietnam increased, Schlesinger 
tried to limit liberalism's responsibility for the war. In 
his history of the Kennedy presidency, A Thousand Days, 
Schlesinger tried to apologize for JFK's role in Vietnam. 
Though American troop strength in Vietnam increased from 
685 to 16,732 during his presidency, Kennedy felt we were 
"over-commited" in South Vietnam, and planned to withdraw 
the troops he had sent there, not send more, according to 
Schlesinger. More broadly, liberals should not forget that 
while they became connected with Vietnam policy by mistake, 
a jingoistic foreign policy, contemptuous of world opinion, 
is the natural approach for American conservatives. In 
particular, the enormous influence of the American military 
often guarantees that our foreign policy will be bellicose, 
expensive, and foolish. 12 
11Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage: 
Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton 
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Those to the left of the vital center saw the con-
nection between Vietnam and liberalism very differently. 
According to a 1966 editorial in Nation: 
Essentially, the membership of ADA now says of Asia 
what non-ADA ••• liberals said about Europe in the late 
forties and fifties: that the danger of a Communist 
military take-over was vastly exaggerated, and that the 
cold war was in large part a make-work and make-profit 
enterprise.l3 
Vietnam was the vindication for that wing of liberal-
ism that had been purged from the vital center by Schlesinger 
and the ADA, according to this argument. "The course of 
events since 1948 has largely confirmed what [Henry Wallace] 
had to say about the cold-war policies Truman substituted 
for the wartime policies of Roosevelt." 14 
What was the liberal view of Communism that was 
redeemed by the vital center's responsibility for Vietnam? 
Under friendly peaceful competition, the Russian 
world and the American world will gradually become more 
alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more of the 
personal freedoms; and we shall become more and more 
absorbed with the problems of socio-economic justice.l5 
We would be well-advised, according to this argument, to take 
Soviet claims to having a non-discriminatory society devoted 
13
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to equal opportunity seriously--seriously enough to see in 
the Soviet Union a challenge to the discrimination and in-
equality in our society that can only be remedied by more 
American equality. To be sure, the Soviet Union denied 
many political and personal liberties, but their people do 
not really miss them. "Perhaps Russians just have a dif-
ferent set of habits about civil liberties." 16 
According to "anti-anti-Communist" liberals, equating 
Communism with fascism or totalitarianism is unwarranted. 
Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have been dictator-
ships, but the Soviet dictatorship's concern was making Russia 
a better country for all its people, while the Nazis were a 
small clique bent on oppression. Unlike right-wing dictator-
ships, Communist Russia, and China, and Cuba "arose from 
intolerable social conditions and all tried to correct these 
conditions with a measure of social creativity." Similarly, 
the aggressiveness of Communist nations' foreign policy has 
been greatly exaggerated. Geographic and strategic interests 
have been far more important to Soviet foreign policy than 
ideology, and even Soviet ideology has been more receptive 
16
stuart Chase, "Back to Grandfather," Nation, 19 May 
1945, p. 566; Henry A. Wallace, "Jobs, Peace, Freedom," New 
Republic, 16 December 1946, p. 789. 
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to co-existence than Cold Warriors would have us believe. 17 
II 
The issue of anti-Communism provided the clearest 
boundary between liberalism and the lmerican left, but other 
questions more directly related to the welfare state also 
mattered. One critique made by Arthur Schlesinger of the 
progressives of the forties was that they had a dogmatic 
approach to policy-making, far removed from the pragmatism 
that was liberalism's key virtue. 
History has discredited the hopes and predictions of 
doctrinaire progressivism about as thoroughly as it has 
those of conservatism. The progressive "analysis" is 
today a series of dry and broken platitudes, tossed out 
in ash-heaps (where they are collected and dusted off 
by the editors of the liberal weeklies).18 
Only a doctrinaire leftist could fail to perceive that demo-
cratic capitalism offers political opportunities for the 
alleviation of economic ills, rendering a revolutionary 
transformation unnecessary, according to Schlesinger. 19 
Schlesinger's deeper criticism of the left is that 
it is hopelessly sentimental. "The defining characteristic 
17Henry Wallace, "On Testifying in Washington," New 
Republic, 26 April 1948, p. 10; "The False Analogy," NatiOn, 
26 April 1965, p. 436; I.F. Stone, "Toward World V!ar III," 
Nation, 7 February 1948, p. 146. 
18schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 36. 
19Ibid., pp. 47-48, 153. 
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of the progressive, •.•• is the sentimentality of his approach 
to politics and culture." 20 The progressive believes that 
"tolerance, free inquiry and technology, operating in the 
framework of human perfectibility, would in the end create 
a heaven on earth, a goal much more wholesome than a heaven 
in heaven." 21 The horrors of modern history cannot disabuse 
the leftist of his faith in technology and progress. His 
naive optimism about human nature is impervious to the lessons 
of the twentieth-century. The leftist's sentimentality is 
most obvious with regard to his view of the Soviet Union, says 
Schlesinger. "However he looks at it ••• the USSR keeps coming 
through as a kind of enlarged Brook Farm Community, complete 
with folk dancing in native costumes, joyous work in the 
fields and progressive kindergartens." 22 
Their sentimentality has rendered leftists politically 
irrelevant. Schlesinger contrasts the pragmatists, for whom 
liberalism is a "practical program to be put into effect" 
with the "Doughface progressives, who use liberalism as an 
outlet for private grievances and frustrations." "On the one 
hand are the politicians, the administrators, the doers; on 
the other, the sentimentalists, the utopians, the wailers." 23 
20
rbid., pp. 36-37. 
21 Ibid., p. 38. 
22
rbid., pp. 37, 40-41. 
23 Ibid., p. 154. 
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The leftist is politically irrelevant not only because his 
ideas are so tenuously connected to modern reality, but 
because he really views politics as a stage for moral postur-
ing, not an arena for action. "Thus the expiatory role of 
resolutions in progressives' meetings. A telegram of protest 
to a foreign chancellery gives the satisfaction of a job well 
done and a night's rest well earned." 24 
The liberal weeklies Schlesinger derided certainly 
included Nation and New Republic. In the years following 
World War II both magazines reflected popular front senti-
ments. Henry Wallace was actually the New Republic editor in 
1947. Its pages reflected the effete purism that Schlesinger 
criticized. "No thinking liberal ••• can find more than two 
dozen members of the present Congress worthy of future sup-
port."25 Nation, too, evinced an excessive concern for 
political symbolism. Its support for the 1946 Full Employ-
ment Act was delivered in these terms: "The important thing 
is the principle established, the expectation aroused, the 
26 pressure generated." While the :t-~ation has remained faith-
ful to the left-wing position, the New Republic quickly 
24Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
25Henry Wallace. "The Sell-Out Eightieth Congress," 
New Republic, 4 August 1947, pp. 15-16. 
26 I. F. Stone, "The Reserva tionists," Nation, 22 
September 1945, p. 275. 
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joined the vital center of Schlesinger and the ADA. By 
the sixties, a New Republic article could criticize the 
New Left in these pragmatic terms: 
The New Left is interested in, not power per se, but 
finding a defiant posture to hold in facing a power which 
probably can't be overthrown or which one does not really 
want to unseat •••• While Acton did say that all power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, it is 
not demonstrable that absolute impotence purifies 
absolutely, ••• 27 
The New Left may have taken some positions similar 
to the progressives' of the forties, but centrist liberals 
criticized it in different terms. One contention was that 
the New Left was never really serious about politics. At 
least the Old Left thought its gestures mattered; the New 
Left seemed to accept, even celebrate, its own irrelevance. 
The New Left routinely acceded to its most radical and 
frivolous elements, for fear of seeming authoritarian, and 
thereby consigned itself to the periphery of American 
politics. The middle-class students who comprised the New 
Left were interested in playing at radicalism, rather than 
actually changing America for the better, and often focused 
on issues completely irrelevant to the poor. 28 
27
seabury, "Gideon's Army," p. 25. See also, James 
MacGregor Burns, "John F. Kennedy: Candidate on the Eve: 
Liberalism Without Tears," New Republic, 31 October 1960, 
p. 16. 
28
schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, p. 218; James 
Ridgeway, "Freak-Out in Chicago: The National Conference of 
the New Politics," New Republic, 16 September 1967, p. 12; 
James Gilbert, "Lost Chance," review of The Movement, by 
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The New Left was as self-righteous as it was frivo-
lous, liberals claimed. "What distinguishes the New Left is 
not only its unwillingness to define what its aims are ·after 
the revolution but its belief that such mystification is a 
virtue." 29 Such intolerance inevitably lead to the decomposi-
tion of the New Left, as even slight doctrinal differences 
occasioned the formation of splinter groups. Their intolerance, 
and youthful impatience, led the radicals to give up on 
America, and believe in the most sinister view of it and the 
most drastic steps to reform it. "The rationale of revolu-
tionaries boils down to this: I know I am right; that know-
ledge overides all else; I have been unable to get my views 
accepted; I will therefore try to get rid of the system that 
rejects them." 30 
Arthur Schlesinger made the additional point that 
American conservatives were the principal beneficiaries of the 
New Left. His premise is that as American politics becomes 
more passionate it becomes less liberal. In 1968 he wrote: 
If the New Left should finally succeed in making American 
politics a competition in hysteria and force, does any 
New Leftist really suppose that Tom Hayden and Elridge 
Irwin Unger, in New Republic, 6 July 1971, pp. 29-30; Chris-
topher Jencks, "Limits of the New Left," New Republic, 21 
October 1967, p. 20. 
29schlesinger, Crisis of Confidence, p. 39. 
30 Ibid., p. 220; Jenck.s "New Left," p 20· "Dissent 
and Disorder," New Republ1c, 15 May 1~71, p. 8; lrv1fig Howe, 
"Historical Memory, Political Vision," New Republic, 9 November 
1974, p. 26. 
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Cleaver will bring more armed men into the streets than 
George Wallace?~l 
Reactionaries needed the New Left, and the urban riots, to 
lend credence to their hysterical portrait of America; some 
of the more perceptive radicals acknowledged this fact and 
rejoined the world of the politically mature, Schlesinger 
claims. 32 
But 1966 was unlike 1948. Liberals, divided by 
Vietnam and beginning to realize the complexity and intracti-
bility of the problems of race and poverty, lacked the intel-
lectual authority to dispatch the New Left as they had the 
Old. The Nation, in fact, found some sympathetic things to 
say about the New Left in the sixties. The Young radicals, 
it claimed, had the same passionate concerns as earlier genera-
tions of leftists, but were free of the dogmatism that en-
cumbered the Popular Front. "The New Left looks not only 
concerned but honest, open, free of icons, full of courage, 
and, above all, alive." 33 
The consequence of these attacks on the vital center 
is that the left boundary of liberalism is very hazy. One of 
31s hl · c · · f c f"d 44 c es1nger, r1s1s o on 1 ence, p. • 
32rbid., pp. 250-251, 272. 
33 Howard Zinn, "The Old Left and the New: Emancipa-
tion From Dogma," Nation, 4 April 1966, p. 389. See also, 
"Henry s. Kariel, "The Persistence of Power," review of The 
End of Liberalism, by Theodore Lowi, in Nation, 15 September 
1969, pp. 253-254. 
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the historical functions of liberalism has been to take 
measures, proposed by the American left for the purpose of 
replacing capitalism, and implement them in a way that 
merely modifies the existing political economy. Those 
liberals who reacted to the assaults of the sixties by in-
sisting that there were certain ideas and measures liberalism 
could not embrace, and aspects of the American political 
order that must be defended unqualifiedly, were not called 
defenders of the vital center--they were called neo-conser-
vatives. Liberalism is different from leftism, but is 
unwilling to make its differences too clear, lest future 
prospects for assimilating policy measures he limited. There-




The ambiguities and pitfalls of their relationship 
to the left have rendered liberals only too happy to try to 
define a clear division between themselves and conservatives. 
Arthur Schlesinger has frequently made the argument that the 
fundamental difference between the two is their attitude 
34
clecak, pp. 61-62, 88; Schlesinger, The Politics 
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towards change. Liberals welcome change and seek to make 
the best of it. Conservatives fear change, preferring the 
settled past to the unknown future. These opposing atti-
tudes fit nicely into a cyclical pattern of American history. 
According to Schlesinger, American politics oscillates 
between periods of innovation, when liberalism is ascendant, 
and conservative eras where those gains are consolidated and 
assimilated. The sixties saw the release of the energy that 
was pent up during the fifties; the nation will eventually 
end its period of recuperation from the sixties and re-embrace 
liberalism. 35 
Other liberal characterizations of conservatism are 
equally straightforward, but less respectful. Conservatism 
is described as irresponsible, incapable of distinguishing 
"legitimate social protest" from the "gratuitous mischief of 
agitators," and therefore inclined to "identify a particular 
status quo with the survival of civilization." Other liberals 
accuse conservatism of being exploitative, "playing on the 
frustrations and angers of embittered voters." And there is 
finally the assertion, made more or less plainly, that con-
servatives just aren't too bright. "This nation will be fortu-
nate indeed on the day when it has a genuine conservative 
35
schlesinger, "Liberalsim," p. 12; Schlesinger, 
Politics of Hope, pp. x-xi, 67; Schlesinger, "Is Liberalism 
Dead?" pp. 73, 79. 
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movement which can match the ADA in intelligence and defi-
nition of the issues."36 
While liberals see how conservatives could be better, 
they do not think it likely that they will become part of a 
constructive dialogue on public affairs. Schlesinger's dis-
missal of the fifties' "New Conservatives" was brusque: "The 
civilized community has moved on to other things." 37 A 
decade later, New Republic referred to Barry Goldwater's 
followers as "the Absurd Right," while Nation called them 
"genocidal lunatics." The option of taking conservatism 
seriously was one that few liberals considered. "One has to 
realize," writes James Nuechterlein, "that many liberals 
genuinely cannot understand a political perspective that 
departs significantly from liberal assumptions." 38 
There was a kind of conservatism that earned some 
respect from liberals in the fifties and sixties. It was 
personified by Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio. Some liberals said 
36
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37James Richlesy, "The New Conservatives' Last Gasp," 
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Republic, 19 October 1959, p. 57. 
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that Taft was the voice of "genuine American conservatism;" 
their reason for saying this was their belief that conserva-
tives like Taft, for all their protests about the costs of 
the welfare state, would eventually come around to acquiesce 
in its programs. To have these green eye-shade conservatives 
keeping the books was not a bad thing for liberalism, but 
this liberal characterization of conservatism makes it clear 
that the sort of adversary liberals prefer differs from 
liberalism only by degree; the real conservative is just a 
cautious libera1. 39 
Perhaps the most fundamental liberal criticism of 
conservatives is that they are apologists for America's 
plutocracy. According to Schlesinger, conservatives must 
"renounce the theory that the only freedom worth worrying 
about is the freedom to make money, and that the only people 
worth listening to are those who have made a great deal of 
40 
money." More recently, the emergence of the neo-conserva-
tives has been attributed to the desire of those intellectuals 
to defend and justify their affluence and prestige. Another 
article speaks of the new sophistication with which corpora-
tions have entered the market place of ideas, providing the 
39Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "His Eyes Have Seen 
The Glory," Collier's, 22 February 1947, pp. 12-13, 34-40; 
"How to Be Conservative," Nation, p. 210; Schlesinger, 
Politics of Hope, p. 71; "Get Douglas, Get the Liberals," 
Nation, 9 June 1969, p. 716. 
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seed money for theoretical subtleties that mask "a crude, 
mean-spirited, demagogic attack on the welfare state, a kind 
of class struggle by some of the haves against many of ·the 
have-nots." 41 
Arthur Schlesinger has argued that the rich have 
been politically shortsighted in the U.S. Their loathing for 
Franklin Roosevelt was not only "indecent," given the trifling 
sacrifices his policies exacted, but it had a "fatuous inten-
sity," scarcely comprehensible in later years. There seems 
to be, Schlesinger argues, an inverse relationship between 
business and political acuity. The classes comprised of those 
who became rich through boldness and keen insight are timid 
and obtuse when it comes to politics. The wealthy consistently 
fail to see how minor, painless concessions can protect the 
system from which they have profited, and obdurately resist 
h t . f 42 even t e mos 1nnocuous re orms. 
Those American conservatives--"traditionalists" who 
rely heavily on the thought of Edmund Burke, are left in an 
untenable position by the shallow politics of America's upper 
classes. The absence of an artitocratic tradition has left 
those conservatives groping in vain for the "rich, humane, 
and somber sentiments of European conservatism." Schlesinger 
41Philip Green, "The I'm All Right Jacobites," 
Nation, 14 October 1978, p. 361.; Howe, "Right Menace," p. 16. 
42
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argues that America's plutocracy lacks all the political and 
moral sensibilities that inform F.uropean conservatism, leav-
ing only narrow materialism as a motivation. "Property seems 
to be the only symbol which American conservatives of the 
twentieth century can offer a spititually hungry people--
property raised to the dry religion of free enterprise." 43 
The other sort of American conservative, the liber-
tarian, who stresses the importance of unfettered markets 
and limited government, is criticized by liberals for being 
unrealistic about the nature of the American economy. In 
the first place, the modern American economy differs enor-
mously from the free-market ideal praised by conservatives. 
Large corporations wield power--economic, political, and 
social--that effectively limits the impact of supply and 
demand. These corporations have their own bureaucracies, 
and, liberals have argued, they are as stultifying and 
impenetrable as the government bureaucracies decried by con-
servatives. Conservatives, in sum, have chosen to defend an 
uncomfortable fact by referring exclusively to an irrelevant 
"d 44 1. ea. 
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The politics of the American businessman are a 
further source of embarassment to the conservative, liberals 
have argued. Capitalists have historically been the least 
reliable defenders of capitalism. The political power of 
American business is constantly being exerted to gain protec-
tion against foreign competition, subsidies and tax conces-
sions, acquiesence in cartel arrangements, and cheap access 
to government-owned land and resources. That the entrepreneurs 
and their conservative apologists can expect the public to 
overlook this dense history of government activity while 
simultaneously believing that the nation is imperiled by 
pathetically small sums for the poor, is an incongruity 
liberals point to insistently. 45 
So conservatives who praise the free market are 
unrealistic, according to this liberal argument. Other 
liberals have gone on to argue that even as a theoretical 
construct, more or less accurately represented in some facets 
of the working economy, the market is seriously deficient. 
There are, in the first place, important public needs that 
are ill-served by free enterprise. The private sector cannot 
do certain things well, because of a lack of capital, or an 
insufficient rate of profit, or the need to commit resources 
45schlesinger, Vital Center, p. 30; "In Justice to 
Hayek," New Republic, 21 May 1945, p. 695, "Welfare Cheating," 
Nation, 13 September 1975, pp. 197-198; Fairlie, "Big Govern-
ment," p. 25. 
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for a longer period of time than private investors will 
accept. The politically realistic will accept that needs 
such as slum clearance and housing for low-income families 
. t b bl . t . t 46 are go1ng o e pu 1c sec or proJec s. 
Liberals believe that the market economy, even 
under the best circumstances, is inadequate in another way 
conservatives fail to realize. Defenders of free enterprise 
who praise its skill in maximizing satisfaction because 
everyone gets to "vote" with dollars fail to realize how the 
results of this election are distorted by economic inequality. 
Some appetites are satisfied fully and others are scarcely 
acknowledged in the market, regardless of their objective or 
social importance. If the government did not intercede to 
correct this situation the needs of minimally decent housing 
and jobs will be ignored. Public action alone can supply a 
reminder of values forsaken in the market. 
The laissez-faire economy is to a large extent charac-
terized by ••• the exploitation of the economic weak by 
the economic strong. Under the laissez-faire economy 
labor is treated as a commodity rather than as being made 
up of precious human beings entitled to all the dignities 
and human rights of free men and women.47 
46
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In the liberal view, the market mechanism provides 
a vital public function in setting the price and directing 
the use of goods and services. But they depart from conserva-
tives, who, as they see it, are guilty of uncritical loyalty 
to the market. The liberal position is that political wisdom 
consists of respecting the market's capabilities and its 
limitations. The government cannot surrender the determina-
tion of the national agenda to purely economic forces, and 
once it does establish priorities, it must be prepared to 
intervene in the economy when the private sector fails to 
supply certain needs. Given the tendency of the business 
community to grasp for ever greater political power, liberals 
favor a permanently antagonistic--or at least wary--relation-
ship between government and business. 48 
Liberals have argued further that the conservative 
critique of the welfare state is undercut by conservatives' 
blind faith in free enterprise. No matter how persuasive a 
particular critique from the right may be, the conservative 
alternative iS invariably "leave it to the market," and this 
is often no solution at all. "However ineffectual government 
may be today, it seems impossible to deny that most of what 
it tries to do needs doing, that the problems it confronts 
48
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1 . d . . 1149 are rea , ser1ous, an 1ncreas1ng ••• There simply are no 
sane private sector solutions to problems that affect millions 
of people and require centrally organized solutions. 
To attack current proposals to increase the coverage 
and benefits of our social security laws as "statism" 
does not tell us what to do about the unemployed, the aged, 
the widowed, the sick, and the physically disabled. What 
are the alternatives to a greatly expanded government 
social security program?50 
From the late forties until the mid-1960s liberalism 
was intellectually preeminent, and both those on the right and 
left had to define their positions with respect to the widely 
accepted premises of liberalism. Now the center is much 
weaker, and defines itself in terms of those on its left and 
right, often mechanically splitting the differences between 
them. What caused the vitality, and then the devitalization 
of the center? Events over which liberal intellectuals had 
no control, such as Vietnam and the civil rights movement, 
played a large role in the fortunes of liberalism. We have 
also seen how liberalism's intellectual shortcomings, its con-
fusions about democracy, change, and egalitarianism, have 
49Melville J. Ulmer, "Friedman's Currency," New 
Republic, 6 November 1976, pp. 8-9. 
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hampered it--when liberal ideas came closer to being realized 
in the sixties, these flaws became more apparent. 
With respect to the specific question of its· place 
on the spectrum, liberalism was vital when it saw its dif-
ferences from conservatives as differences of degree, and 
differences from the left as qualitative. During its best 
years liberalism shared the task of defending a free society 
with conservatives, a shared goal which made the liberal cri-
ticism of conservative economics m~re effective; it was the 
conservatives who were endangering free society by refusing 
to accept even modest reforms. It was possible in this era 
for liberals to speak abruptly to leftists, criticizing the 
sentimentality, the perfectionism, their blindness to the 
imposing truths of our century. 
The shocks of the sixties, including the assault 
by the New Left against liberalism, rendered liberals in-
capable of stating vigorously what they were and were not 
about. Throughout the seventies, liberals' ideas were 
generated on the left--affirmative action and feminism being 
conspicuous examples. In the meantime, liberal attacks on 
the right grew more heated and less likely to acknowledge a 
common purpose or core of values. It is not surprising that 
liberals faced electoral difficulties in this period, for 
they seem to have willfully alineated millions of voters who 
could not accept the leftist critique of American foreign 
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and domestic policy. And it is not surprising that liberalism 
is in intellectual disarray while in flight from its historic 
role of tempering, while upholding, the traditional institu-
tions and patterns of a free society. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ASSESSING POSTWAR LIBERALISM 
Vital Center liberalism was preeminent during the 
fifties and early sixties because it was both pertinent to 
the major political issues and reassuring. It provided a 
framework for considering the Cold War, civil rights, and 
the welfare state that seemed to assure intellectuals con-
siderable latitude within the boundaries of the public's 
sensibilities. The happy and frequent discoveries of the 
end of ideology reflected the widespread acceptance of 
liberalism. But the center bas been all but completely 
devitalized since Vietnam and the Great Society. To re-
establish itself as a public philosophy, liberalism will 
have to reconstitute itself on a foundation that brings the 
American understanding of justice, liberty, and individual 
responsibility to bear on the problems of political economics. 
I 
Liberals are entitled to be discouraged by their 
current predicament. The Great Society ought to have vindi-
cated the liberals' efforts to secure an American welfare 
state. Instead, it marked the beginning of an era of 
144 
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of astonishing hostility towards liberalism. "For twenty-
five years the liberals had struggled ••• to carry out their 
ideas, but by the end of the Great Society, and for several 
years after, few men even dared to identify themselves as 
liberals." 1 The Vietnam War was a leading factor in the 
decline of liberalism. The American working class was 
appalled by the peace movement, its shrillness, and its 
flaunted counterculture. Liberals had enjoyed the support 
of workers and idealistic young people--the enmity among 
their constituencies split liberalism badly. 2 So too did 
liberals' reaction to a feeling of responsibility for an 
unpopular war. Vietnam gave liberals accustomed to battling 
entrenched interests the novel and distasteful chance to 
oppose the liberal establishment. "It is this confusion in 
liberal ranks that explains so much of the radicalizing of 
the Left and of the general state of intense passion and 
febrile disorientation in the liberal community of the 
60's." 3 
Quite apart from its administrative difficulties, 
the Great Society as a legislative accomplishment posed 
1Martin, p. 191. 
2Michael Walzer, Radical Principles: Reflections 
of an Unreconstructed Democrat (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 
pp. 172-173. 
3Nuechterlein, "The People vs. The Interests," 
p. 70. 
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serious difficulties for liberals. The extent of liberalism's 
victory was undeniable. As William Leuchtenburg wrote: 
For those who since the Great Depression had waited in 
vain for another era like that of the New Deal, the 
first half of the 1960's was a time for rejoicing, and 
the Eighty-ningh Congress recalled the halcyon days of 
1935. "It is the Congress of accomplished hopes," 
declared Sepaker John W. McCormack. "It is the Congress 
of realized dreams."4 
But the realization of so many dreams at once depleted the 
liberal agenda. Fearful of being absorbed by history, 
liberals tried to develop new goals sooner than they might 
have wanted. And their close identification with the Great 
Society made liberals hostages to the success of its 
5 programs. 
The confluence of the civil rights and anti-poverty 
issues almost immediately complicated the Great Society, and 
left liberalism in a truly precarious position. The pro-
found moral passion of the civil rights movement was brought 
to bear on the Great Society, insisting that it solve the 
complicated and urgent problems of the northern ghetto. 
Liberals were not so much averse to this demand as they were 
unprepared for it, and the attempt to save the ghetto and 
4william E. Luechtenburg, "The Travail of Liberal-
ism," in The Unfinished Century: America Since 1900, ed. 
William E. Luechtenburg (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 
p. 816. 
5Martin, pp. 191-192; Wildavsky, "Government and 
the People," p. 26. 
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its inhabitants took on the frantic, desparate qualities of 
a battleground. 
Community action programs, Model Cities, busing, affirma-
tive action, job training, housing laws, rent supple-
ments, food stamps, and all manner of services--the 
liberals tried many things. Had any one of them succeed-
ed in reducing the poverty and segregation of blacks, 
there would have been no liberal failure and no liberal 
reappraisal. But none did; the slums continued, even 
grew worse.6 
George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign may 
be taken as the culmination of the efforts to vindicate 
liberalism by applying its precepts ever more assiduously to 
the problems of post war America. One can date the reluc-
tance of prominent politicians to call themselves liberals 
from McGovern's utter defeat at the polls. Yet even before 
the votes were counted some liberals were criticizing 
McGovern's domestic policy proposals as politically reckless 
and economically dubious. These misgivings were the first 
signs of a desire to rethink liberalism, a need that would 
become more acute throughout the seventies. 7 
The Watergate scandals ought to have been a 
reprieve for liberals. Certainly it helped launch or prolong 
the careers of many liberal politicians. But those who call 
6Martin, p. 258. 
7Melville J. Ulmer, "McGovern's Economics," New 
Republic, 24 June 1972, pp. 21-23; "McGovern's New Economics," 
New Republic, 16 September 1972, pp. 8-9. 
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for greater government activity in the service of certain 
causes have not been helped by the public's deepened cynicism 
about government and its works. Watergate, following on 
Vietnam and the Great Society, contributed to an atmosphere 
of mistrust of the federal government. To contemplate the 
apotheosis of Sam Ervin from unyielding segregationist and 
states' rights defender to Watergate hero is to wonder whether 
Richard Nixon did not get the last laugh on his liberal 
tormentors. 8 
By the end of the seventies, by the time Proposi-
tion 13 and Ronald Reagan were winning huge electoral victor-
ies, liberalism seemed to be in utter disarray. Jimmy Car-
ter's ambiguous politics~ and liberals' uncertainty about how 
to position themselves in relation to him, did nothing for 
the clarification of liberalism. Keynesian economics seemed 
irrelevant to the "stagflation"--high unemployment and high 
inflation--of the seventies. The populist impulses lodged in 
liberalism made it difficult to oppose a tax revolt carried 
out through popular referenda. The legacy of the sixties 
remained to be defended; the problems of how to make only 
limited changes in the programs, and how to discover and 
publicize their successes seemed perpetual. 9 
8Martin, p. 258. 
9
"Guns and Margarine," New Republic, 4 February 
1978, p. 6; Al Stern, "Liberal Programs Must Match Promise 
With Performance," Center Magazine, March/April 1981, p. 49; 
"In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic, 13 December 
1980, p. 5. 
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The pressures of these difficult circumstances 
brought about the most serious internal dissension and self-
criticism among liberals since Henry Wallace and his follow-
ers were read out of the liberal movement. Some liberals 
looked at their philosophy and found it terribly stale. 
The ADA platform of 1947 is pretty much national policy 
of 1966--welfare, education, housing, employemnt, civil 
rights. Improvements can be made, implementation is 
still spotty, ••• but the main points ADA ••• wanted to make 
have been made.lO 
Some liberals were willing to say out loud that enactment of 
the Great Society constituted a fair test of liberalism, 
that liberalism had been proven less than completely adequate 
by this test, and that liberals' who responded to these 
developments by calling for more of the same were not helping 
matters. 11 
A related criticism of liberalism made by liberals was 
that its tenets were not only old, but were defended reflexi-
ively by those determined to avoid contact with any new, 
uncomfortable ideas. Melville Ulmer, writing in the New 
Republic in 1976, said that liberals' reactions to the issues 
of the seventies were "thoroughly predictable, ••• uniformly 
devoid of that creative thought that festering, unsolved 
10Andrew Kopkind, "Humphrey's Old Pals: An Account 
of the ADA Convention," New Republic, 7 May 1966, p. 19. 
11 See, for example, Eugene J. McCarthy "What's To 
Be Dt=!cided?" New Republic, 27 July 1968, pp. 12-13. 
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12 problems ought to warrant." Rather than comfortably retain-
ing such questionable legacies as the anti-trust laws, the 
tax deductability of home mortgage interest, and Medicare 
and Medicaid, liberals should reevaluate how these policies 
contribute to a just society. To refuse to do so "would con-
firm the triumphant right-wing view of liberalism as a purely 
reactionary defender of the mid-20th-century status quo." 13 
Probably the most damaging internecine attacks con-
cerned the relationship between liberals and blacks and the 
poor. The heightened sensitivity of some liberals to the 
needs and dignity of these groups led to harsh criticism of 
other liberals, those who continued in the traditional role 
of political brokers for the disadvantaged. The Citizens 
Crusade Against Poverty, established by Walter Reuther and 
the United Auto Workers, was dismissed as a "coalition of 
elitist groups" in which the participation of real poor people 
was mere "window dressing." 14 Where the Wagner Act had 
conferred real political power on labor unions, the liberals' 
anti-poverty efforts amounted to plantation politics, based 
12Melville J. Ulmer, "Jobs, Inflation, and Liberal 
Politics," New Republic, 20 March 1976, p. 6. 
13
"In Defense of Good Intentions," New Republic, 13 
December 1980, p. 5. 
14
"The Poor Are Human," Nation, 2 May 1966, p. 508. 
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on the assumption that liberals knew the needs of the poor 
better than the poor did themselves. 15 Liberals who had never 
before doubted their own good intentions were shocked by these 
accusations, and reacted by acceding to the demands of every 
aggrieved constituency. Before the seventies, liberals' 
clients--blacks, poor people, youth, women, Indians--had been 
willing to let established liberal leaders be their spokesmen. 
In the seventies these groups not only insisted on speaking 
for themselves, but on pressing issues "extraneous to liberal-
ism" and unrelated to "the larger issues of poverty and the 
slums." 16 Liberals reacted, most conspicuously in the 
McGovern campaign, by giving away the store. "The liberals 
of 1972 carried liberalism so far that they quit being 
liberals." 17 Not only did they encourage all their client 
groups to speak for themselves, but they found it impossible 
to resist even the most extreme claims of these groups once 
they did speak. In embracing the "amnesty, acid, and abor-
tion" agenda, liberals alienated their largest single con-
stituency, the blue-collar worker. In embracing quotas, 
15 
"By or For the Poor?" New Republic, 30 April 
1966, pp. 5-6. 
16M t• ar 1n, pp. 208-209. 
17Ibid., p. 217. 
152 
affirmative action, and busing, liberals raised troubling 
questions about the limits of their willingness to use govern-
ment coercion in the service of social justice. 18 
Some of the harshest criticism of liberals came 
from those in the poorly demarcated area between liberalism 
and the New Left. They charge that liberalism has made so 
many compromises with the American power structure that it 
has become a better tool for preventing social justice than 
advancing it. In this view, the welfare state, such as it 
is, has two purposes. Its programs are supposed to be just 
sufficiently anesthetizing to forestall truly fundamental 
political change. And the measure of social control it pro-
vides is not meant to strengthen society's weakest members, 
19 but to extend and systematize the power of the strong. 
Even those who could be placed closer to the main-
stream of American liberalism criticized the Great Society 
for placating the middle class and trying to reform rather 
18 Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
19Richard Flacks, "Is the Great Eociety Just a 
Barbecue?" New Republic, 29 January 1966, p. 19; DHvid 
Ben~man and Luther Carpenter, "Dead End of an Ideology," 
Nat1on, 8 November 1975, pp. 459-460; Ronald Radosh, "New 
Lease for Liberalism," Nation, 26 August 1968, pp. 149-150. 
See also Gettleman and Mermelstein, p. 179; Elinor Graham, 
"The Politics of Poverty," in Gettleman and Mermelstein, pp. 
216-217; Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," 
in Gettelman and Mermelstein, p. 492, p. 86; Christopher 
Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1969), pp. 9-11. 
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than assist the poor. Lyndon Johnson's insistence on attain-
ing consensus was the perfect example of liberalism at its 
most timid, these critics say. The Great Society was not 
only an opportunity to challenge the belief that people were 
poor as a result of their own shortcomings; the success of 
its programs absolutely required the repudiation of this 
bromide. Instead, the War on Poverty became "a war on the 
poor, aiming to change them beyond all recognition." 20 
Liberalism lost its best opportunity for moral leadership, 
according to this argument, by accomodating middle-class 
notions about poverty resulting from individual failings, by 
the failure to argue that social disorganization caused 
poverty and social reorganization alone could solve it. 21 
II 
The thinking and policies of postwar liberalism have 
not been left completely undefended. In the interests of 
making it possible to pursue such policy goals in the future, 
some liberals have felt the need to challenge the prevailing 
20 Jencks, "Johnson vs. Poverty," p. 18. 
21 Ibid. See also Stephen Rousseas, "Consensus 
Liberalism: Johnson's Eisenhower Premise," Nation, 23 Novem-
ber 1964, pp. 375-379; Richard F. Hamilton, "Conviction or 
Compromise: The Trap of the Great Society," Nation, 22 
November 1965, pp. 385; Stephen W. Rousseas, "The Great 
Society: An Old New Deal," Nation, 10 May 1965, p. 501; Paul 
Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor," Nation, 
20 September 1965, p. 197. 
154 
assessment of the Great Society. "The 'proof' of the Great 
Society's shortcomings, which probably has been accepted as 
given by a majority of· the public and its policy makers, 
remains a primary obstacle to renewed social activism," write 
Levitan and Taggert?2 Thus liberals of this persuasion insist 
that the liberal approach to government has had significant, 
though little-noticed successes. The income transfer programr:, 
despite their disarray and inequities, saved millions of 
Americans from destitution, and were particularly successful 
in feeding the hungry. 23 Even those programs with higher, 
and vaguer goals, such as the Job Corps, overcame problems 
with their clients, funding, and administration, making a 
profoundly beneficial difference in the lives of many 
trainees. 24 
Those who defend Great Society liberalism insist 
that its success was greater than the sum of the successes of 
its individual programs. It's true that the most expansive 
goals of the Great Society were the ones that left it vulner-
able to ridicule and charges of abject failure. But just 
getting the broader goals of social justice on the nation's 
22Levitan and Taggert, p. 5. 
23Nick Kotz, "The Politics of Welfare Reform," New 
Republic, 14 May 1977, p. 17; Nick Kotz, "Feeding the Hungry," 
New Republic, 25 November 1978, pp. 20-22. 
24 Ralph W. Tyler, "The Federal Role in Education," in 
Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 172-173. 
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agenda constituted a real advance. According to Levitan 
and Taggert: 
The specifics of the Great Society were not as crucial as 
its underlying thrust. The social welfare efforts begun 
in the 1960's were based on the belief that the future is 
not predetermined but can be molded by our energies and 
resources, that our nation is not condemned to passive 
acceptance of inequality of opportunity, povert~S hunger, 
urban blight, high unemployment and other ills. 
What is important is that such ambitions clearly became the 
nation's business. That the programs were far from completely 
successful means only that the Great Society "turned out about 
as any sensible person should have expected." 26 
Some liberals also feel that a fair evaluation of 
the welfare state is impossible owing to the prevalence of 
conservative criteria for such judgments. They argue that 
the widespread belief that the private sector is inherently 
free and the public sector inherently coercive is wrong. The 
poor who receive government assistance are not coerced but 
liberated by the additional income. Measures to reduce 
economic insecurity, such as unemployment compensation, do 
not coerce workers, but enable them to seek out better oppor-
tunities.27 Harald Malmgren wrote: 
25Levitan and Taggert, p. 12. 
26Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons of the 1960's," 
in Ginzberg and Solow, p. 220. See also Robert J. Lampman, 
"What Does it Do for the Poor?--A New Test for National 
Policy," in Ginzberg and Solow, pp. 67-68; Levitan and Tag-
gert, p. 8. 
27
"Adam Smith Updated," New Republic, 16 March 
1959, pp. 3-4. 
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More gadgets Tor the affluent may make life nicer for 
the affluent, but surely more gadgets for them is less 
important socially than more hospitals, better transport, 
better schools. Remember, it is the poor who need these 
things, and the poor are least able to afford even that 
which is available.28 
There is a final liberal argument in defense of the 
modern welfare state, which holds that conservative critics 
of the welfare state have made unwarranted generalizations 
from the experience of the Great Society. Some liberals have 
argued that the Great Society was beset by too many unusual 
problems to support such generalizations. It was neither 
inevitable nor necessary that the welfare state should have 
taken on an agenda so ambitious as the Great Society's. 
Whatever the merits of community action and the attempt to 
attack many causes of poverty simultaneously, the Great 
29 Society incurred heavy political debts with such approaches. 
Even worse was the way in which the grandiose rhetoric of the 
members of the Johnson administration, particularly Johnson 
himself, created expectations that the Great Society inevi-
tably failed to meet. In launching the War on Poverty the 
Johnson administration "wantonly blur[red] the distinction 
28 Harald Malmgren, "The Economy: A Case for 
Efficient Planning," New Republic, 7 November 1964, p. 43. 
29
see MiJton Viorst, review of The Politics of 
Neglect, by Bernard J. Frieden and Marshai-r-kaplan, in New 
Republic, 20 December 1975, pp. 25-26. 
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between campaign promises and legislative commitments ••• There 
was no prospect that any government could deliver on such 
ambitious promises, certainly not within the time limits that 
an impatient public would allow." 30 
Even the most heroic policy making could not have 
redeemed the ungoverned rhetoric that launched the Great 
Society. But the half-hearted efforts ultimately put forth 
made matters far worse. The New Republic described the general 
pattern: "The President outlines the need in broad strokes, 
submits legislation that is far less brave and comprehensive 
than his rhetoric, then Congress whittles it down to size or 
throws it away." 31 Vietnam and rising inflation emboldened 
Congressional conservatives, giving Johnson even less room 
to maneuver. An additional problem was the Johnson admini-
stration's habit of winning initial Congressional approval 
for a program by understating long-term costs; this eventually 
created a large number of "undernourished" programs. 32 
The failure to adequately fund the Great Society 
was the most grievous missed opportunity of liberalism, but 
30Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons," pp. 213-213. 
See also Steinfels, p. 224. 
31
"What's Congress Doing?" New Republic, 7 May 
1966, pp. 7-8. 
32
rbid.; Ginzberg and Solow, "Some Lessons," pp. 
216-217. 
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liberals have argued that the American polity has always been 
niggardly towards its welfare state. Income transfer programs 
that give too little aid to too few people are derided ·as 
extravagant. Congress would authorize experimental programs, 
then not only fail to provide sufficient budgets, but called 
these programs to account long before the experiments could 
have possibly succeeded. Having ensured that the programs 
could only disappoint, Congressmen have then gone home to 
deride wasteful bureaucracies. 33 
III 
To fairly assess the argument that liberalism's 
approach to the welfare state has not been proved a failure, 
but has never really been tried, would require knowledge about 
what welfare state policies could have been implemented since 
1945 and what, realistically, they might have accomplished. 
It is unlikely that the question of the time and money re-
quired for a fair test of liberalism can ever by anything but 
an extension of the debate over whether or how to have a 
welfare state. 
Whatever merit there may be in the claims that the 
welfare state has been a victim of circumstances, liberals 
33Richard Haitch, "The Twenty-Fifth Child," Nation, 
19 October 1963, pp. 238-241; :Cudley Post, "Requiem for 
Model Cities," New RE:public, 14 April 1973, p. 15. 
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cannot complain that history has failed to provide them with 
laboratory conditions for building a welfare state. Liberals 
cannot control events, but they can control their own utter-
ances, the subject of this study. When liberals were more 
successful at explaining their ideas in ways acceptable to 
the American people, neither world war nor depression brought 
liberalism to a crisis comparable to its present one. To the 
extent that the clear expression of political ideas paves the 
way for a nation to make sacrifices or accept disappointments 
in the pursuit of certain goals, and it is the assumption of 
this study that this role is not inconsiderable, liberalism 
has suffered from an inability to persuasively articulate its 
purposes, or explain the consequences, pleasant and unpleasant, 
of their pursuit. 
How has liberalism failed to justify its welfare 
state program? Liberals seek a commitment from the American 
people to the government to alleviate suffering and guarantee 
economic security. The fact that even President Reagan has 
been unw~lling or unable to reduce or eliminate many programs 
suggests that most Americans are broadly sympathetic to these 
goals. But liberals tolerated a continuing lack of clarity 
about the nature of the commitment to the needy. Liberals 
have not settled the question of what sort of claim those who 
cannot live on the fruits of their own labor have on the pub-
lic fisc. There seems to be no satisfactory middle ground 
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between treating public support as a right, a claim sure to 
be resented by many middle-class wage earners, or a privilege, 
an arrangement that the poor may regard as both tenuous and 
degrading. But the difficulty of the choice does not excuse 
the failure to make it. This is an area where ambiguity is 
likely to increase rather than restrain the conflicting claims 
of those who contribute to and those who receive from the 
welfare state. Even where liberals seemed to make a force-
ful stand on the issue, with the encouragement of the welfare 
rights movement, the rights they were appealing to were the 
positive rights already a part of existing welfare legisla-
tion. The question of whether these positive rights had a 
d . t"f" t• .d t d 34 eeper JUS 1 1ca 10n was s1 e-s eppe • 
Regarding the limits of the commitment they seek 
from the American people to aid the poor, the delineation of 
what a full and sufficient welfare state would be, liberals 
are similarly unclear. The liberal assertion that we should 
do more is often advanced; an answer to the question of how 
much more never is. Arguing for the Full Employment Bill in 
1946, the Nation stated that "the important thing is the 
principle established, the expectation aroused, the pressure 
35 generated." It is tactically questionable to assume that 
620. 
34 Clecak, pp. 79-80; Nation, 23 May 1966, pp. 602, 
35
r.F. Stone, "The Reservationists," Nation, 
22 September 1945, p. 275. 
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the partial liberal agenda will forge a mandate for the full 
agenda; as the experience of the sixties suggests, the partial 
agenda may discredit the full one. But it is even more reck-
less to fail to outline the full agenda, trusting that pressures 
and expectations created by the partial one will somehow cause 
that agenda to manifest itself. Indeed, it is not unfair to 
wonder whether there is such a thing as a full liberal agenda, 
a complete picture of how the welfare state should finally 
look. There are, for example, many good questions about the 
advisability of a guaranteed income plan, such as the negative 
income tax. But liberals seem not to fear that such a plan 
might fail, but that it might succeed, thereby creating 
political pressure to dismantle or reduce other parts of the 
welfare state. Such fears call into question the sincerity of 
the liberal concern for the poor. 36 
The most serious failure of liberalism as a system 
of ideas is the refusal to disavow the Ponzi scheme aspects 
of the welfare state. Taxing the middle class to benefit the 
middle class can secure political support for the welfare 
state for a long time, perhaps indefinitely. But while the 
quantity of such political support may be very great, the 
quality is of a sort that undercuts the benevolent purposes 
of the welfare state. It is a system that encourages people 
36Margaret S. Gordon, "Failures of Unemployment 
Insurance," Nation, 7 June 1965, p. 611. 
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to ask what their country can do for them, and to become 
resentful of the welfare state as soon as they decide .it is 
not enough. 
Jobn Frederick Martin has described the "politics 
of consumerism" as a political approach to the American 
people that regards all their claims and grievances as equally 
and fully legitimate. The politics of consumerism calls on 
the government, not to adjudicate among competing claims, or 
to defer some and deny others, but to strive ceaselessly to 
fulfill them all. Martin regards the politics of consumerism 
as liberalism's first, aberrant, response to the bewildering 
circumstances of the 1970s, a response that was exemplified 
by Jimmy Carter's first presidential campaign. But given 
liberalism's continuing inability to speak against anyone's 
claims on the nation's wealth, except those put forward by the 
malefactors of great wealth, it seems more reasonable to 
regard liberalism as essentially rather than accidentally 
related to the politics of consumerism. 37 
In failing to make clear how and to what extent the 
welfare state would help the poor, while making it very clear 
that nearly everyone should in some manner benefit from the 
welfare state, liberalism has left the poor in an unneces-
sarily precarious political position. Founding the welfare 
37Martin, p. 262. 
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state on appeals to self-interest, rather than on honest 
acknowledgment of the need for sacrifices in the national 
interest, has made it easier to build the welfare state, but 
left it a less sturdy structure than it might have been. 
That liberals should resent the American middle class for a 
acting unapologetically on the basis of self-interest, as in 
the passage of Proposition 13, is a tenuous position, given 
how little liberals have done to get Americans to think in 
any other terms. 
It was the contracting economy of the seventies 
that fully revealed the disarray in liberal thinking. There 
was no Keynesian remedy for persistent and simultaneous infla-
tion and unemployemnt. The abrupt end of the postwar economic 
expansion made the dalliance with qualitative liberalism seem 
effette. Most importantly, as the fiscal dividend vanished, 
it became clear that American liberalism had lost the capacity 
to provide useful advice about difficult political questions. 
The mistake of supposing postwar prosperity to be without end 
and without limits, though very great, was a pardonable mis-
perception, given the extraordinary performance of the 
economy during the 1950s and 1960s. But liberals' readiness 
to believe that scarcity had been abolished was not unrelated 
to their reluctance to speak disagreeable truths about the 
need to transfer wealth from those who are self-sufficient 
to those who are not. If the stark experience of limits 
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concentrates the mind, as Samuel Johnson supposed imminent 
hanging did, then the cozy illusion that one has broken free 
from limits dissipates and corrodes thought. 
Loathe to tell the great majority of Americans that 
they partake of a national obligation to the poor, the dis-
charge of which will cause some discomfort, liberals have 
preferred to respond to a sputtering economy by railing 
against the rich and the large corporations. American 
liberalism is too sentimental and too fuzzy to have a great 
deal in common with Marxism, but it does partake of the 
fundamental Leftist suspicion of the rich and powerful in 
a capitalist society. The problem comes, as Nuechterlein has 
pointed out, when liberals seek to find a role for the Ameri-
can common man in this morality play. The actor is simply 
not suited to play the heroic proletarian. Liberals have, 
as a consequence, been placed in the awkward position of being 
more at home in harsh economic times, when the middle class 
might acutely sense an affinity for the poor and a resentment 
of the rich, than during prosperity, when the middle class 
reverts to its disappointing narrowness. Liberalism will be 
in need of rethinking until it is able to stop ascribing 
virtues to the typical American he does not have, or denying 
those that he does have. 
Liberalism is in a state of crisis because it is 
unclear about the nature of its own message and about the 
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audience it seeks to reach. Whether the welfare state seeks 
only to alleviate the harshness of a private enterprise 
economy, or to supplant it with a socialized economy cannot 
be ascertained from the writings of the most prominent 
liberals. Americans who are neither rich nor poor cannot be 
certain whether they are being urged to disposses the one group 
group or assist the other. And Americans sympathetic to the 
charitable goals of liberalism are wary of how far the liberal 
agenda might extend. As Chesterton pointed out, a man who 
will walk right up to the edge of a cliff on a sunny day will 
stay miles away from it on a day thick with fog. Until 
liberals can be much less equivocal about the full implica-
tions of their program, they will continue to be denied the 
full support that their best impulses deserve. 
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